Value Theory: (Bloomsbury Ethics)

Table of Contents:
1. Value and Normativity 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Which Evaluations? 1.3 The Idea of Value Theory 1.4 Value and Normativity 1.5 Overview 1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality 1.7 Value Theory: The Questions 2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co. 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples 2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value 2.4 The Reduction to Facts 2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value 2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value? 2.7 Summary 3. The Challenge against Absolute Value 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness 3.3 Foot and the Virtues 3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way 3.5 Zimmerman's Ethical Goodness 3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes 3.7 Summary 4. Personal Value 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Moore on Good and Good For 4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes 4.4 Moore Strikes Back? 4.5 Agent-relative Value 4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative 4.7 Summary 5. The Chemistry of Value 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations 5.3 Organic Unities 5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value 5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value 5.6 Holism and Particularism 5.7 Summary 6. Value Relations 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability 6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability 6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations 6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity 6.6 Parity and Choice 6.7 Parity and Incomparability 6.8 Summary 7. How Do I Favour Thee? 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring 7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing 7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value? 7.5 Summary 8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals 8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem 8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response 8.5 Reasons for What? 8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons 8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority 8.8 Summary

About the Author :
Francesco Orsi is Senior Research Fellow in Practical Philosophy at the University of Tartu, Estonia.

Review :
Orsi provides a detailed but succinct exploration of every axis of value theory, with special attention to the fitting attitude theory. Clearly written and tightly argued, this book is a thorough guide to the shape of value that also advances current debates in creative and engaging ways. Scott A. Davison, Professor of Philosophy and Chair, Department of History, Philosophy, Religion and Legal Studies, Morehead State University, USA Francesco Orsi's Value Theory is the first thorough overview of all the main distinctions and debates in the rich philosophical tradition of investigating the evaluative realm. It is also historically informed, clear, balanced, and well-argued overall. Dr Jussi Suikkanen, Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, UK Orsi's book lucidly explores core conceptual questions at the very fore of value theory. The focus is on the much-discussed fitting-attitude analysis of value, and Orsi serves as an excellent and attentive guide, as the reader explores the advantages as well as the more serious rocks and shoals inherent in this approach. Not only is the book a great introduction to this pattern of analysis, it provides a distinguished contribution to contemporary value theory. Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, Professor of Practical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden