Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies: The Truman Doctrine in Greece, 1947-1952

Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies offers a reassessment of the Truman Doctrine. In this insightful, thorough, and carefully documented study, Judith Jeffery tests the truth of the claim that America's peacetime intervention in Greece was a model on which to base other such ventures. In March 1947, President Truman launched a program of U.S. aid to Greece. Truman saw in Greece, which had been shattered by World War II, not only a dire situation needing humanitarian aid, but also an opportunity to assert American authority in this early period of the Cold War: civil war waged by the Communist-backed guerrilla movement against the government was threatening to further destroy the country. The president and his administration thus dispatched American troops with the directive to destroy the Communist forces. The defeat of the Communists in 1949 was hailed as a great U.S. military achievement. Did this achievement come at the expense of the Truman Doctrine-which made explicit that the first priority of President Truman and his administration in defeating communism was to improve the standard of living in Greece? How do claims about the success of the aid program measure up against the original intentions of the Administration in mid-1947 and against the program's real outcome at the beginning of the 1950s? What was the real story behind the Greek Communist defeat? Jeffery's cogent analysis of events from 1947 to 1952 provides fodder for today's heavily contested debates about U.S. foreign policy and intervention.

Table of Contents:
Chapter 1 Abbreviations Chapter 2 Acknowledgments Part 3 Introduction Chapter 4 Historical Background to the Truman Doctrine Chapter 5 Outline of Existing Interpretive Literature Part 6 Prologue: 1941-1946 Chapter 7 Introduction Chapter 8 Requests Prior to Liberation (1941-1944) Chapter 9 From Greek Liberation to U.S. Commitment Chapter 10 Conclusion Part 11 The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan Chapter 12 Introduction Chapter 13 The British Exit Chapter 14 The First American Economic Mission to Greece: January to April 1947 Chapter 15 Drafting the Truman Doctrine Chapter 16 The Truman Doctrine: The Greek Request for Aid and Truman's Response Chapter 17 Reaction to the Truman Doctrine and the Emergence of the Marshall Plan Chapter 18 The Marshall Plan and Greece Chapter 19 Conclusion Chapter 20 Publicity and Commitment Chapter 21 Introduction Chapter 22 Perceptions of the Greek Question before the Truman Doctrine Chapter 23 In the Wake of the Truman Doctrine: Press and Public Reaction Chapter 24 Conclusion Part 25 Controlling the Aid Program Chapter 26 Introduction Chapter 27 Public Law 75 and the Agreement on Aid to Greece Chapter 28 The Greek "Establishment" Chapter 29 The Amnesty Program Chapter 30 The American Mission for Aid to Greece Chapter 31 Greek Politics and U.S. Influence Chapter 32 Taxation Reform Chapter 33 Reform of the Greek Civil Service Chapter 34 Conclusion Part 35 The Military Aid Program Chapter 36 Introduction Chapter 37 U.S. Ground Troops for Greece? Chapter 38 Redirecting the Aid Program Chapter 39 Conclusion Part 40 1948: Facing Failure Chapter 41 Introduction Chapter 42 The 1948 Aid Debate Chapter 43 Conclusion Part 44 The Defeat of the Democratic Army Chapter 45 Introduction Chapter 46 The Origin of the Division within the KKE Chapter 47 Yugoslav-Soviet Relations and the Greek Civil War Chapter 48 The United States and the Yugoslav-Soviet Split Chapter 49 1949 and the End of the Civil War Chapter 50 Conclusion Part 51 The Results of Intervention: Early 1949 Chapter 52 Introduction Chapter 53 The Wyman Report Chapter 54 The Refugees Chapter 55 An Extra-parliamentary Solution? Chapter 56 The Military Aid Program: 1949 Chapter 57 Conclusion Part 58 From Necessity to Choice: The Early 1950s Chapter 59 Introduction Chapter 60 Observations of U.S. Priorities and Economic Aid Chapter 61 The Moody Report and the Economic Aid Debate Chapter 62 Politics: 1950-1952 Chapter 63 Military Aid: 1950-1952 Chapter 64 Greece and NATO Chapter 65 Conclusion Part 66 Conclusion Part 67 Epilogue Chapter 68 Greece, 1953-1967: The Road to the Colonels' Coup Chapter 69 The United States in Greece: A Model Intervention? Chapter 70 Appendix 1: Greek Governments in Office 1944-1952 Chapter 71 Appendix 2: Report of the American Economic Mission to Greece Chapter 72 Appendix 3: Message to President and Secretary of State from Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Chapter 73 Appendix 4: Message of the President to the Congress Chapter 74 Appendix 5: An Act to Provide Assistance to Greece and Turkey Chapter 75 Appendix 6: Exchange Notes between the U.S. and Greek Governments Chapter 76 Appendix 7: Text of Agreement on Aid to Greece Chapter 77 Appendix 8: The Greek Situation and ECA Chapter 78 Bibiography Chapter 79 Index

About the Author :
Judith S. Jeffery received a Ph.D. in American Studies from Flinders University of South Australia. She is an archivist with the South Australian government.

Review :
Jeffery's contribution to the debate [over the Truman Doctrine] is welcome. Jeffery's fine monograph explores President Harry S. Truman's claim that the Truman Doctrine prevented a Communist Party takeover in Greece.