Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956

This first detailed account of Soviet military operations is based on access to unpublished material in Soviet archives, which have recently been reclassified. The major contribution made by the book is its source material, which reveals new information on the organization, command, strategy, and tactics of the Soviet armed forces which invaded Hungary in 1956. Particularly interesting is the precise documentation of the irrationally large size of the forces. The volume is based on research in Soviet archives, and this alone makes it of unique scholarly importance. The book opens with a substantial introductory essay by the editors, and includes a major study by the Russian military historian Alexandr Kirov, based on research in Soviet military archives. One of the real strengths of the book is that it also includes the memoirs of General Yevgeny Malashenko, in 1956 a colonel in the Soviet Army and acting Chief of Staff of the Special Corps in Budapest. He provides unparalleled insights into Soviet military procedures, politico-military co-operation, and the actual fighting strengths and weaknesses of the Red Army. Very few other high-ranking Soviet officers have ever published their memoirs in the West.

Table of Contents:
Preface to the Series and Acknowledgements Abbreviations Additional Data on the History of the Soviet Military Occupation (Jenő Györkei and Miklós Horváth) Soviet Troops in Hungary after World War II "Soviet Troops Must Enter Budapest" The Hungarian Revolution and Events in Poland Comrade Hegedűs Makes a Request "The Hungarian Army Has Done Badly The First Shots and the Occupation of the Radio Station What Was Known in Moscow of the Hungarian Events The Hungarian People's Army and the Revolution The "Division of Labor" Changes The Policy for the Peaceful Liberation of the Captive Nations and Its Forces Brought to Budapest Prove Insufficient Soviet Tanks Open Fire-Kossuth Square, October 25, 1956 "We Increase the Number of Troops Active in Budapest Further Reasons for the Divisions in the Hungarian People's Army "The Military Viewpoint Overtakes the Political Viewpoint” "Two Possible Routes Lie Ahead of Us" The Final Attempt The Attack Begins "The Situation is Deteriorating" Counter-Revolution? National Democratic Revolution? "How Can We Master the Situation? Real Power: the Army!" Soviet Troop Withdrawal from Budapest "At Present the Number of Soviet Troops Stationed Here is Adequate" "Troops Must Stay in Hungary" Mikoyan's Unsuccessful Attempts Imre Nagy Demands an Explanation-Kádár Speaks in Support of Nagy "Nobody Wanted a Counter-Revolution" Murders, Atrocities and Kádár's Propaganda Intrigues Central Leadership of the Revolution "Revolution is Revolution" The Command ofBudapest Public Safety Forces is Formed The Soviet Embassy "Siege" National Guard Supreme Command is Formed Polish "No," Yugoslav "Yes" "This Government Should Not Be a Puppet Govemment"

About the Author :
Jeno Györkei is retired Lt. Colonel of the Hungarian Army and researcher of the Hungarian Military History Institute in Budapest. His main field of interest is the military history of the 1956 Revolution and the Soviet intervention. Miklós Horváth is Lt. Colonel of the Hungarian Army and researcher of the Hungarian Military History Institute in Budapest. He has published extensively on the subject of the Hungarian 1956 Revolution and has translated many original documents from Russian sources.

Review :
“This unique collection of three essays on the 1956 Soviet military intervention in Hungary uses recently unclassified material from the Soviet archives. The essay by Russian military historian Alexander Kirov concludes that the major lesson of 1956 is that Russian military should not again oppose popular sentiment in a country. The two editors, Hungarian military historians, contribute an essay outlining their own view of events. In contrast Y. I. Malashenko offers his recollections of events in which he was a key participant. His observations are based on memories of oral communications of the invading military force rather than on written documents…the controversies generated are stimulating.” “The main strength of this book is that it draws on a wide variety of documents and documentary collections from several Hungarian archives and one Soviet archive that were declassified after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Institute for the Study of 1956 Revolution in Budapest has published a plethora of books and documents, but unfortunately very few have been translated into English. Thus Györkei’s volume is a good start and it will serve as a helpful reference work, containing as it does tables, maps and bibliographic notes. Finally, I believe Malashenko is correct that this book helps to ‘contribute to the reconciliation of our peoples (Hungarian and Russian)’.” “The two authors convincingly argue and document it was indeed a democratic revolution…it is a valuable contribution to Cold War History.”