State Responsibility for Support of Armed Groups in the Commission of International Crimes: (40 Queen Mary Studies in International Law)

State Responsibility for the Support of Armed Groups in the Commission of International Crimes examines the law on attribution of conduct of individuals to states. Under established principles of international law, State responsibility only arises where armed groups act under the direction or control of the State, or are completely dependent on the State. These tests are under inclusive as they do not consider the different ways states can exert control over armed groups in the commission of international crimes. Ramsundar presents an interesting examination into the possibility of liberalization of the rules of State responsibility. The examination considers subtle ways states can exert control over armed groups in the commission of international crimes. Her proposal presents a compelling argument for widening the scope of responsibility to states through useful modifications to interpretation of the tests of control and dependence.

Table of Contents:
 Preface  Abbreviations and Acronyms  Table of Cases  Table of Legislation and Treaties 1Introduction  1.1A Proposal for a More Considered Approach Towards Attribution of Individual Conduct to States  1.2Challenges Involved in Modification of the Tests of Attribution of Conduct of Individuals to States  1.3Modifying the Tests for Attribution of Conduct of Individuals to States Through a Less Literal More Purposive Interpretation of “direction,” “control” and “complete dependence”  1.4Use of Terms  1.5A Word on Methodology  1.6Overview of Structure 2The Coordination of State and Individual Responsibility for International Crime  2.1Rationale for Coordination between the Two Regimes  2.2Limitations of the Regimes of Individual Responsibility  2.3Potentials and Limitations of the Regime of State Responsibility  2.4Existing Proposals for the Interaction between the State and Individual Regimes of Responsibility   2.4.1 The Systemic Nature of International Crimes – the Röling Thesis   2.4.2 Development of the Röling Thesis among Contemporary Commentators  2.5The Major Categories of Interaction between State and Individual Regimes of Responsibility in Addressing Support of Armed Groups   2.5.1 The State and the Armed Groups as a Common Criminal Organisation   2.5.2 Concurrent Assignment of Responsibility to States and Individuals   2.5.3 Increased use of Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility to Charge High-level Individuals   2.5.4 Further Considerations of Concurrent Assignment of Responsibility   2.5.5 Modifying the Test of Attribution of Conduct of Individuals to States  2.6Alternatives to Modifying the Test of Attribution of Conduct of Individuals to States  2.7Situation of this Work within the Existing Literature 3Attribution of Conduct of Non-State Armed Groups to States under the Current Regime of State Responsibility  3.1The Key Role of Attribution in the State Responsibility Regime and the Early Debate on Attribution   3.1.1 The Early Debates on Attribution  3.2Attribution in the Work of theILC  3.3TheICJ’s Approach to Attribution to a State of the Conduct of Non-State Armed Groups   3.3.1 Nicaragua   3.3.2 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo   3.3.3 Bosnian Genocide   3.3.4 Dissenting Views in Bosnian Genocide  3.4Limitations of the Current ICJApproach 4The Tests of Attribution of Conduct of Individuals Applied in International Human Rights Court  4.1Circumstances in Which Other International Courts and Tribunals have Attributed the Conduct of Individuals Affiliated to Non-State Armed Groups to States  4.2The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights to Questions of “jurisdiction” for the Purpose of Application ofECHRObligations   4.2.1 Ilaşcu v Moldova   4.2.2 Cases brought a gainst Turkey   4.2.3 Suggestions from these Case Studies  4.3The Approach of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to Questions of “jurisdiction” for the Purpose of Application of ACHR Obligations   4.3.1 Paniagua Morales   4.3.2 Pueblo Massacre   4.3.3 Mapiripan Massacre   4.3.4 Suggestions from these Case Studies  4.4Discussion 5The Tests for Assigning Criminal Responsibility in the International Criminal Courts and Tribunals  5.1Individual Responsibility for Participation in Crimes of a Collective Nature  5.2Challenges Posed by the Prosecution of International Crimes  5.3Conspiracy  5.4Joint Criminal Enterprise   5.4.1 JCE 1 – “Shared intention”   5.4.2 JCE 2 – Inference of Intention from Knowledge of the Common Plan   5.4.3 JCE 3 – Inference of Intention where Crimes are Foreseeable  5.5Perpetration   5.5.1 Co-perpetration   5.5.2 Indirect Perpetration  5.6Discussion 6The Case for Variation of the Tests of Attribution of Criminal Conduct to States  6.1Responsibility Arising Out of Support Armed Groups in the Commission of International Crimes during Conflict  6.2Rationale Behind the Law for the Current Approach Towards Attribution Under the Law of State Responsibility  6.3Limitations of the Current Approach in International Accountability  6.4Current Solutions to Mitigating Against these Limitations that Arise from the Current Tests Attribution of Conduct from the Academic Literature  6.5Current Solutions to Mitigating Against These Limitations that Arise from the Current Tests Attribution of Conduct from Jurists  6.6Variation of the Tests of Attribution of Conduct of Armed Groups to States   6.6.1 Joint Criminal Enterprise Model   6.6.2 Co-perpetration Model   6.6.3 Indirect Perpetration Model   6.6.4 Human Rights Model  6.7Variation of the Tests of Attribution of Conduct  6.8Challenges Posed by these Suggested Solutions  6.9Scope for Further Research in this Area Bibliography   Articles   Memoranda   Books and Chapters in Books   Other Secondary Materials Index

About the Author :
Narissa Kashvi Ramsundar, Ph.D (2017), Queen Mary University of London, is a Senior Lecturer at Canterbury Christ Church University.