The common roots of success and failure in economic growth and development lie in the systemic governance and fragmentation of institutional complementarities, respectively, but not in the unilateral adaptation of market-led or state-led models. To substantiate this argument, Akan utilizes case countries from the United States, South Korea, and Turkey—an advanced developed, a recently developed, and a developing country. Akan provides a simple framework for understanding two points that go beyond ideological obsession. The first is how a model of G&D works and evolves; with its economic, financial, industrial, and political dynamics intertwining. The second is why a market-led or state-led model succeeds and fails in both developed and developing countries.
Table of Contents:
List of Tables and Figures
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. Systemic governance and the fragmentation of complementarities
2.1 Institutional complementarity: negative or positive?
2.2 Systemic governance of complementarities 2.3 Institutional fragmentation and drift
2.4 Institutional trap
2.5 Conclusion
Chapter 3. Rise and fall of the market-led model: the United States
Introduction
3.1 A complementarity theoretic account of American growth, 1948–17
3.2 Before the Great Depression of 1929
3.3 The US kind of systemic governance, 1948–72
3.4 Institutional fragmentation in the US model, 1973–2006
3.5 Industrial policy: the visible hand of the US model
3.6 The politics of growth: the President and the market
2.7 Conclusion: Institutional trap in the Great Recession period, 2007–17
Chapter 4. Rise and fall of the state-led model: South Korea
Introduction
4.1 The systemic governance of the Korean kind, 1961–79
4.2 Primordial institutional fragmentation in the Korean model, 1980–96
4.3 Embedding of institutional fragmentation, 1997–2007
4.4 Institutional trap between developmentalism, deregulation, and Maturation, 2008–15
4.5 Floating industrial development
4.6 Fragmentation versus democratization
4.7 Inequality as a complement of nonsynchronous development
4.8 Conclusion
Chapter 5. Neither by state nor by market: the Turkish case
Introduction
5.1 The political roots of ideological Balkanization
5.2 Economic policy-making in successive reactions: developmentalism, neoliberalism and austerity
5.3 Corporate governance: concentrated ownership, market capitalization and foreign debt
5.4 Industrial and institutional performance in Turkey
5.5 The institutional fragmentation in Turkey’s developmental experience
5.6 Explaining the institutional trap of G&D in Turkey
5.7 Conclusion
References
Index
About the Author :
Taner Akan is Associate Professor of Political Economy at Istanbul University, Turkey; and Visiting Fellow, King’s College London, UK. His research interests include institutional theory, political economy and economic governance.
