Feelings of Believing: Psychology, History, Phenomenology

In Feelings of Believing: Psychology, History, Phenomenology, Ryan Hickerson demonstrates that philosophers as diverse as Hume, Descartes, Husserl, and William James all treated believing as feeling. He argues that doxastic sentimentalism, therefore, is considerably more central to modern epistemology than philosophers have recognized. When the empirical psychology of overconfidence and attention is brought to bear on the history of philosophy and the phenomenology of believing, all point toward belief as fundamentally affective. Understanding believing as feeling has the potential to make us better believers, both by encouraging suspicion of unexamined certainties and by focusing attention on credulity. Hickerson argues that believing is typically felt but not given attention by the believer, and he suggests that virtuous believers are those who pay careful attention to their own sentiments-- who attempt to raise their beliefs to the level of judgments.

Table of Contents:
Contents Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction: Recovering Sentimentalism Chapter One: Feeling Disbelief: Hume’s Doxastic Sentimentalism Chapter Two: Feeling Certain and The Circle: A Sentimental Interpretation of Cartesian Clarity Chapter Three: The Psychology of Overconfidence Chapter Four: The Feeling of Self-Evidence: Husserlian Evidenz as Gefühlsindex Appendix to Chapter Four: Straw Men in Dark Times Chapter Five: Doxasticity as Electricity: William James and the Live Hypothesis Chapter Six: Attention and Feeling Noticed: Phenomenology and Psychology Conclusion: Beliefy Feelings, Whence and Whither Bibliography

About the Author :
Ryan Hickerson, PhD, teaches philosophy at Western Oregon University.

Review :
Also the author of The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness from Brentano through Husserl, 2007) Hickerson (Western Oregon Univ.) has written a complex and subtle treatment of what he calls "doxastic sentimentalism," which is the theory that belief is not solely or primarily a cognitive state but also an affective state. In short, belief is as much a matter of feeling that one believes as it is anything else. Hickerson develops this thesis in conversation with empirical psychology and a variety of philosophers: Descartes, Husserl, and William James among others. The book is carefully argued and well written. . . Those working in the area will find it a useful contribution to the literature and well worth reading. Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty. There has been a slowly developing appreciation from various quarters in recent decades that the overlap between the philosophy of the emotions and epistemology might be greater than one would initially assume. Ryan Hickerson’s Feelings of Believing: Psychology, History, and Phenomenology makes a timely and highly original contribution to this discussion. . . . Feelings of Believing is much more than just an excellent book for specialists. It is something quite rare in this day, namely, a good book of philosophy as such. With its readable, personable style, broad-ranging survey of topics and figures, and lucid exegesis and argument, generalists will find this book as enjoyable and educational as specialists will find it insightful and provocative. Its apparently niche topic and eclectic approach should not deter the general reader. This is an outstanding book for all students and researchers of philosophy. This groundbreaking book sets out to assess the prospects for doxastic sentimentalism––epistemologically, psychologically, phenomenologically, and historically. Nuanced, subtle, and trenchantly argued, Hickerson’s book breaks new ground in exploring the rich and complex nexus of relationships between cognition and sentiment. Hickerson's Feelings of Believing is an ambitious work, and it fulfills these ambitions. It is historically sensitive, but with a modernizing eye, while also being empirically informed. It will appeal to a wide variety of scholars. In this richly researched and carefully argued book, Ryan Hickerson draws upon the history of philosophy, contemporary empirical research, and robust phenomenological insights to defend both the prevalence and the plausibility of doxastic sentimentalism—the view that feeling is necessary for belief. It is mandatory reading for those interested in the psychology, epistemology, and phenomenology of belief. Is there a characteristic feeling of believing? In this provocative and illuminating book, Hickerson retrieves a largely overlooked yet fruitful tradition of 'doxastic sentimentalism'. The result is an alternative history of modern epistemology that anyone thinking seriously about the nature of belief would benefit from.