About the Book
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, why has the reform process been incremental although the conditions for more rapid and abrupt transformations appeared to exist? Is there anything specific about financial policy that prevents more radical reforms? Drawing from Comparative Politics and Historical Institutionalism in particular, as well as International Political Economy, this book answers these questions by examining the particular institutional frictions that characterise global financial governance and influence the activity of agents and veto players involved in the process of global regulatory change. The chapters in this volume collectively demonstrate that the process of change in financial rule-making as well as in the institutions governing finance does not fit with the punctuated model of policy change. The book also shows, however, that incremental changes can lead to fundamental shifts in the basic principles that inform global financial governance.'
In this timely, tightly argued, and empirically trenchant study, Moschella and Tsingou provide the strongest statement yet of why national and international post-crisis reform packages have fallen short of their most ambitious goals. Covering virtually every area of the international fi nancial system, the editors and their collaborators detail the origins and consequences of incremental policy changes, but note that, in the end, reforms may produce a subtle transformation in fi nancial market regulation. Great Expectations, Slow Transformations will long remain a major resource for scholars of post-crisis capitalism.' Dr. Orfeo Fioretos, Temple University, Philadelphia, USA 'The Global Financial Crisis was, by any measure, a great systemic shock that has so far led to a series of less-than-great systemic transformations - at least in the area of financial reform. Moschella and Tsingou explain why this is the case. By harnessing the insights of historical institutionalism to those of agent centered constructivism, they show us why great institutional transformations may take a lot longer, and may be significantly more contingent, than we generally think.'
Mark Blyth, Professor of International Political Economy, Brown University, Providence, USA 'Many expected the financial collapse of 2007/8 to evoke signifi cant reform of financial systems around the globe. So far, at least, national governments have been slow to act. Moschella and Tsingou's fascinating volume, Great Expectations, Slow Transformations, helps us understand why. In this thoughtful volume the editors have pulled together a series of well reasoned and persuasive essays examining the politics and political economy of financial reform efforts around the globe. Eschewing the temptation to blame specific interests and their compliant politicians, these authors give us a set of nuanced stories that go beyond the politics of fi nancial reform helping us better understand why institutional change itself is so diffi cult. This book will be of great interest both for political economists interested in the politics of banking and financial regulation in the early 21st century, as well as for Historical Institutionalists interested in the politics of institutional change.Sven Steinmo, Professor and Chair in Political Economy and Public Policy, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Table of Contents:
Contents
List of Figures and Tables vii
Contributors ix
Acknowledgements xi
Chapter One: Introduction: The Financial Crisis and the Politics of
Reform: Explaining Incremental Change
Manuela Moschella and Eleni Tsingou 1
Chapter Two: When New Ideas Meet Existing Institutions: Why
Macroprudential Regulatory Change is a Gradual Process
Andrew Baker 35
Chapter Three: Financial Services Governance in the European
Union after the Global Financial Crisis: Incremental Changes or
Path-Breaking Reform?
Lucia Quaglia 57
Chapter Four: Global in Life, Still National in Death? Special Bank
Resolution Regimes After the Crisis
Martin B. Carstensen 77
Chapter Five: Offshore Financial Centres, Shadow Banking and
Jurisdictional Competition: Incrementalism and Feeble Re-regulation
Thomas Rixen 95
Chapter Six: The Wall-Street—Main-Street Nexus in Financial
Regulation: Business Coalitions Inside and Outside the Financial
Sector in the Regulation of OTC Derivatives
Stefano Pagliari and Kevin Young 125
Chapter Seven: Continuity of Expert Rule: Global Accountancy
Regulation After the Crisis
Sebastian Botzem 149
Chapter Eight: Still in the Market for Change: The Mass Public as
a Veto-Player in US and Danish Mortgage-Systems Reform
Iver Kjar 173
Chapter Nine: Conclusions: Too Little, Too Slow?
Manuela Moschella and Eleni Tsingou 193
Index 217
About the Author :
Manuela Moschella is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Turin. She is the author of Governing Risk: The IMF and Global Financial Crises published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2010. Her research interests include the politics of financial crises and processes of institutional change with a particular focus on the international financial institutions. She has published on these issues in a number of journals, including the Review of International Political Economy, New Political Economy, the Journal of Public Policy, Comparative European Politics and Comparative Economic Studies. Eleni Tsingou is Assistant Professor of International Political Economy at the Copenhagen Business School and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick. She is the author of numerous chapters and articles on the governance of global finance and her work has appeared in Review of International Political Economy, International Politics and International Political Sociology. She was also a member of the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform.
Review :
"The Global Financial Crisis was, by any measure, a great systemic shock that has so far led to a series of less-than-great systemic transformations - at least in the area of financial reform. Moschella and Tsingou explain why this is the case. By harnessing the insights of historical institutionalism to those of agent centered constructivism, they show us why great institutional transformations may take a lot longer, and are may be significantly more contingent, than we generally think." Mark Blyth Professor of International Political Economy Brown University "Many expected the financial collapse of 2007/8 to evoke significant reform of financial systems around the globe. So far, at least, national governments have been slow to act. Moschella and Tsingou's fascinating volume, Great Expectations, helps us understand why. In this thoughtful volume the editors have pulled together a series of well reasoned and persuasive essays examining the politics and political economy of financial reform efforts around the globe. Eschewing the temptation to blame specific interests and their compliant politicians, these authors give give us a set of nuanced stories that go beyond the politics of financial reform helping us better understand why institutional change itself is so difficult. This book will be of great interest both for political economists interested in the politics of banking and financial regulation in the early 21st century, as well as for Historical Institutionalists interested in the politics of institutional change." Sven Steinmo Professor and Chair in Political Economy and Public Policy European University Institute "In this timely, tightly argued, and empirically trenchant study, Moshella and Tsingou provide the strongest statement yet of why national and international post-crisis reform packages have fallen short of their most ambitious goals. Covering virtually every area of the international financial system, the editors and their collaborators detail the origins and consequences of incremental policy changes, but note that, in the end, reforms may produce a subtle transformation in financial market regulation. Great Expectations, Slow Transformations will long remain a major resource for scholars of post-crisis capitalism." Orfeo Fioretos Associate Professor Temple University
