High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars(3 Conflict Classics)

** Includes a New Postcript 'The Chilcot Report-Early Thoughts on Military Matters'** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable.

About the Author :
Christopher L. Elliott retired from the British Army as a Major General in 2002. This book was written over two years while Elliott was a research fellow at the universities of Oxford and Reading.

Review :
Long overdue, 'High Command' is a study of what's wrong at the MoD, and an excellent primer for the Chilcot report. . . . Elliott sets out an agenda for reform as well as a narrative. He does so in terms that Evelyn Waugh could not have bettered. Britain will lose more wars unless military chiefs stop agreeing to impossible missions after a decade of errors in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new book warns... High Command, based on interviews with many of those at the helm of the military and the Ministry of Defence from the turn of the century, also identifies fundamental flaws inside the ministry that set the conditions for failure... Offering a rare insight into the turmoil within the armed forces during one of the most critical decisions of the two wars -- the deployment of British forces to Helmand in 2006 when they were still fighting in southern Iraq. Enthralling, gripping and brutally honest . . . With a gentle, skilful hand Elliott guides the reader through the complex world of 'High Command' to explain why a valiant and well-trained military force was not afforded the proper conditions to succeed -- neither in resources nor in leadership at a political level. It is the responsibility of the chiefs of staff to speak truth to power when Britain goes to war. However, until now they have been accorded little attention in the controversies generated by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Christopher Elliott has put that right, combining an insider's perspective with shrewdness, wit and strategic insight. If we are to learn lessons from the last decade, this is where to begin. This is a diplomatically couched bombshell of criticism of UK decision-making and the conduct of war. A must-read for any journalist and student of IR, strategy, decision-making processes, and organisational psychology, it should be on every reading list right up there with Graham Allison's Essence of Decision. The UK MoD, and Defence Ministries the world over, should reflect on General Elliott's trenchant analysis and wise advice, lest lives and treasure continue to be wasted in ineffective or even counter-productive campaigns. 'High Command' is a clear and balanced account of the strategic direction - and lack of it - in British operations over the past fifteen years. Christopher Elliott brings depressing evidence of gross institutional failure and indicates what should be done to make 'the machinery of government at war' fit for purpose. A well written book and extremely relevant to our times as yet another generation is busy involving us once again in the Middle East. Elliott has provided the ideal primer for the Chilcot report, whenever it arrives. One of his best suggestions is the need for better education for senior offices, to the level of their American peers, particularly in human and political geography. An outstanding book on British military leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Elliott is particularly well qualified to shine a light on the performance of the 'High Command' and does so with highly rigorous analysis, shrewd observations and perceptive insights. A compelling and disquieting account. An impressively original work. Elliott authoritatively describes the blindness and blunders committed by Britain's politicians, civil servants and the military before and after the invasion of Iraq and exposes how the lessons of failure in Iraq were ignored during the venture into Helmand A very welcome present this Christmas was a copy of Major General (Retd) Christopher Elliott's book, 'High Command', about British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. . . . An extremely well written and thoughtful book it examines the causes of these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges that they presented. [Elliott] is meticulous in setting out . . . who was who in key military positions during this period, the structures within which they were working and, based on interviews, their opinions on how 'the system' worked . . . Also, commendably, he concludes with some practical suggestions as to how the system might be changed for the better.