Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond: (Elgar Mini Series)

Building on the pioneering work by the Nobel Memorial Laureate, John Nash, Professor Thomson has brought together a broad selection of seminal articles which analyse and discuss bargaining and the theory of cooperative games. Beginning with a distinguished collection of papers discussing the origins of game theory, this volume systematically explores its development as a tool to illuminate economic behaviour. It includes the work of highly accomplished academics whose discoveries over the years have shaped the direction of this subject. With his insightful introduction, the editor has ensured that this indispensable book is suitable for anyone with an interest in cooperative gaming.

Table of Contents:
Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction William Thomson PART I BASIC PAPERS A Independence 1. John F. Nash Jr. (1950), ‘The Bargaining Problem’ 2. Alvin E. Roth (1977), ‘Individual Rationality and Nash’s Solution to the Bargaining Problem’ 3. Alvin E. Roth (1977), ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem’ 4. Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences’ 5. Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), ‘Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions’ 6. Efe A. Ok (1998), ‘Inequality Averse Collective Choice’ B Monotonicity 7. Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), ‘Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem’ 8. A.E. Roth (1979), ‘An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games’ 9. Ehud Kalai (1977), ‘Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons’ 10. Haruo Imai (1983), ‘Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution’ 11. W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), ‘Monotonicity and Independence Axioms’ 12. P.L. Yu (1973), ‘A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems’ 13. Youngsub Chun (1988), ‘The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems’ C Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Feasible Sets 14. Roger B. Myerson (1977), ‘Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility’ 15. M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), ‘The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game’ 16. Roger B. Myerson (1981), ‘Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems’ 17. Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), ‘Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions’ 18. Hans Peters (1986), ‘Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining’ D Ordinal Invariance 19. Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), ‘Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games’ 20. Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), ‘Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining’ 21. Yves Sprumont (2000), ‘A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces’ 22. Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), ‘An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players’ E Non-convex Problems 23. John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), ‘The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinksy Solutions’ 24. Lin Zhou (1997), ‘The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems’ PART II UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE DISAGREEMENT POINT A Monotonocity 25. William Thomson (1987), ‘Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point’ B Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Disagreement Points 26. Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), ‘Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms’ 27. Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), ‘Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points’ PART III VARIABLE POPULATION OF AGENTS A Population Monotonicity 28. William Thomson (1983), ‘The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population’ 29. William Thomson (1983), ‘Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution’ 30. William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), ‘Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division’ B Consistency and Its Converse 31. Terje Lensberg (1987), ‘Stability and Collective Rationality’ 32. Terje Lensberg (1988), ‘Stability and the Nash Solution’ 33. Youngsub Chun (2002), ‘The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining’ PART IV ENRICHING THE MODEL A Adding Information About Underlying Set of Physical Alternatives 34. Richard E. Kihlstrom, Alvin E. Roth and David Schmeidler (1981), ‘Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem’ 35. Alvin E. Roth and Uriel G. Rothblum (1982), ‘Risk Aversion and Nash’s Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes’ 36. Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha (1990), ‘Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points’ 37. John E. Roemer (1988), ‘Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments’ 38. Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra and William Thomson (1992), ‘On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences’ 39. Zvi Safra and Itzhak Zilcha (1993), ‘Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis’ 40. Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii (1995), ‘A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory’ B Adding Claims 41. Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1992), ‘Bargaining Problems with Claims’ 42. Walter Bossert (1993), ‘An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims’ C Adding Preferences Over Solutions 43. Kim C. Border and Uzi Segal (1997), ‘Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem’ PART V STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS A Analyzing Bargaining Problems as Strategic Games 44. John Nash (1953), ‘Two-Person Cooperative Games’ 45. Eric van Damme (1986), ‘The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal’ 46. Ariel Rubinstein (1982), ‘Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model’ B Manipulation 47. Vincent P. Crawford and Hal R. Varian (1979), ‘Distortion of Preferences and The Nash Theory of Bargaining’ 48. Joel Sobel (1981), ‘Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem’ C Implementation 49. H. Moulin (1984), ‘Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution’ 50. Eiichi Miyagawa (2002), ‘Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions’ PART VI EXPERIMENTS 51. M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), ‘On Dividing Justly’

About the Author :
Edited by William Thomson, Elmer B. Milliman Professor of Economics, University of Rochester, US