The Economics of Conflict: (168 The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series)

The study of conflict and its resolution attracts an ever-increasing number of economists. For this three-volume collection, the editors have selected the most influential previously published papers by leading scholars from the vast and rapidly expanding literature in this field. Volume I addresses the theoretical treaments of conflict, including game theory and rent-seeking; Volume II presents a variety of different applications; and Volume III deals with case studies.

Table of Contents:
Contents: Volume I: Theory Acknowledgements Introduction Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley PART I FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT 1. Thomas C. Schelling (1958), ‘The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory’ 2. Manus Midlarsky (1970), ‘Mathematical Models of Instability and a Theory of Diffusion’ 3. Thomas C. Schelling (1973), ‘Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities’ 4. Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator (1985), ‘Conflict, War, and Redistribution’ 5. Jack Hirshleifer (1994), ‘The Dark Side of the Force: Western Economic Association International 1993 Presidential Address’ 6. Ian Bellany (1999), ‘Modelling War’ PART II DEFENSE, OFFENSE AND DETERRENCE 7. Bruce M. Russett (1963), ‘The Calculus of Deterrence’ 8. Michelle R. Garfinkel (1990), ‘Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium’ 9. Charles H. Anderton (1992), ‘Toward a Mathematical Theory of Offensive/Defensive Balance’ PART III RENT-SEEKING, CONFLICT AND CONTESTS 10. Gordon Tullock (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’ 11. Anne O. Krueger (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ 12. Avinash Dixit (1987), ‘Strategic Behavior in Contests’ 13. Jack Hirshleifer (1988), ‘The Analytics of Continuing Conflict’ 14. Jack Hirshleifer (1991), ‘The Paradox of Power’ 15. Stergios Skaperdas (1996), ‘Contest Success Functions’ PART IV APPROPRIATION AND BANDITRY 16. Stergios Skaperdas (1992), ‘Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights’ 17. Hugh M. Neary (1997), ‘Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict’ 18. Mancur Olson (1993), ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’ 19. Herschel I. Grossman (1994), ‘Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform’ 20. Martin C. McGuire and Mancur Olson, Jr. (1996), ‘The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force’ 21. Charles H. Anderton, Roxane A. Anderton and John R. Carter (1999), ‘Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict’ PART V TERRORISM 22. Richard M. Kirk (1983), ‘Political Terrorism and the Size of Government: A Positive Institutional Analysis of Violent Political Activity’ 23. Todd Sandler, John T. Tschirhart and Jon Cauley (1983), ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism’ 24. Harvey E. Lapan and Todd Sandler (1988), ‘To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question’ 25. Todd Sandler and Harvey E. Lapan (1988), ‘The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists’ Choice of Targets’ PART VI CIVIL WARS, INSURRECTIONS AND REBELLIONS 26. Timur Kuran (1989), ‘Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution’ 27. Herschel I. Grossman (1991), ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections’ 28. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998), ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’ 29. Paul Collier (2000), ‘Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity’ 30. Jean-Paul Azam (2002), ‘Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups: Lessons for State Formation in Africa’ 31. James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler (2002), ‘Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers’ 32. Nicholas Sambanis (2002), ‘A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War’ PART VII CONFLICT RESOLUTION 33. Donald Wittman (1979), ‘How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach’ 34. Robert E. Kuenne (1989), ‘Conflict Management in Mature Rivalry’ 35. Daniel G. Arce M. (1997), ‘Correlated Strategies as Institutions’ 36. Daniel G. Arce M. (2001), ‘Leadership and the Aggregation of International Collective Action’ Name Index Volume II: Applications Acknowledgements An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I PART I APPLICATIONS OF CONCEPTS 1. Philip Mirowski (1991), ‘When Games Grow Deadly Serious: The Military Influence on the Evolution of Game Theory’ 2. Robert J. Leonard (1991), ‘War as a “Simple Economic Problem”: The Rise of an Economics of Defense’ 3. Ole R. Holsti (1963), ‘The Value of International Tension Measurement’ 4. Kenneth E. Boulding (1978), ‘Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies’ 5. Michael D. Intriligator (1982), ‘Research on Conflict Theory: Analytic Approaches and Areas of Application’ 6. Ron P. Smith (1998), ‘Quantitative Methods in Peace Research’ PART II ECONOMIC IMPACTS 7. Seymour Melman (1972), ‘Ten Propositions on the War Economy’ 8. B.F. Kiker and James L. Cochrane (1973), ‘War and Human Capital in Western Economic Analysis’ 9. Saadet Deger and Ron Smith (1983), ‘Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries’ 10. John A.C. Conybeare (1990), ‘A Random Walk Down the Road to War: War Cycles, Prices and Causality’ 11. Kun Y. Park (1993), ‘“Pouring New Wine into Fresh Wineskins”: Defense Spending and Economic Growth in LDCs with Application to South Korea’ 12. David Lai (2001), ‘The Great Power Dilemma: The Trade-Off between Defense and Growth in Great Britain, 1830–1980’ PART III ARMS RACES 13. Hans Rattinger (1975), ‘Armaments, Detente, and Bureaucracy: The Case of the Arms Race in Europe’ 14. Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most (1978), ‘A Return Journey: Richardson, “Frontiers” and Wars in the 1946–1965 Era’ 15. Michael D. Wallace (1979), ‘Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence’ 16. Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito (1984), ‘Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?’ 17. Robert S. McNamara (1986), ‘Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War: Is Star Wars the Answer?’ 18. Charles H. Anderton (1990), ‘The Inherent Propensity Toward Peace or War Embodied in Weaponry’ 19. Michael D. Wallace and Charles A. Meconis (1995), ‘Submarine Proliferation and Regional Conflict’ 20. Susan G. Sample (1997), ‘Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate’ PART IV ARMS TRADE 21. David Kinsella (1994), ‘The Impact of Superpower Arms Transfers on Conflict in the Middle East’ 22. Small Arms Survey (2001), ‘Crime, Conflict, Corruption: Global Illicit Small Arms Transfers’ PART V ARMS CONTROL 23. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg (1997), ‘Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989–96’ 24. Cassady B. Craft (2000), ‘An Analysis of the Washington Naval Agreements and the Economic Provisions of Arms Control Theory’ PART VI SANCTIONS 25. Richard C. Porter (1979), ‘International Trade and Investment Sanctions: Potential Impact on the South African Economy’ 26. William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg (1986), ‘A Model of the Political Economy of International Investment Sanctions: The Case of South Africa’ 27. William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg (1988), ‘The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach’ 28. Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers (1992), ‘Sanctions’ 29. A. Cooper Drury (1998), ‘Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’ PART VII PEACE AND DEMOCRACY 30. Joel T. Campbell and Leila S. Cain (1965), ‘Public Opinion and the Outbreak of War’, and Comments by Anatol Rapoport and Philip E. Converse 31. Patrick James, Eric Solberg and Murray Wolfson (1999), ‘An Identified Systemic Model of the Democracy-Peace Nexus’ 32. John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett (2000), ‘Comment: Why “An Identified Systemic Model of the Democracy-Peace Nexus” Does Not Persuade’ 33. Patrick James, Eric Solberg and Murray Wolfson (2000), ‘Democracy and Peace: Reply to Oneal and Russett’ PART VIII PEACEKEEPING 34. Lawrence R. Klein and Kanta Marwah (1996), ‘Economic Aspects of Peacekeeping Operations’ 35. Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall (1998), ‘International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications’ 36. Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu (1998), ‘Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976–1996’ 37. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’ PART IX TERRORISM 38. Walter Enders, Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley (1990), ‘Assessing the Impact of Terrorist-Thwarting Policies: An Intervention Time Series Approach’ 39. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (1996), ‘Terrorism and Foreign Direct Investment in Spain and Greece’ 40. Daniel M. Schwartz (1998), ‘Environmental Terrorism: Analyzing the Concept’ Name Index Volume III: Case Studies Acknowledgements An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I PART I WORLD WARS 1. R.A. Radford (1945), ‘The Economic Organisation of a P.O.W. Camp’ 2. Louis Baudin (1945), ‘An Outline of Economic Conditions in France under the German Occupation’ 3. Richard B. Heflebower (1946), ‘The Effects of the War on the Structure of Commodity and Labor Markets’ 4. Paul T. Homan (1946), ‘Economics in the War Period’ 5. A.S. Milward (1964), ‘The End of the Blitzkrieg’ 6. R.J. Overy (1975), ‘The German Pre-War Aircraft Production Plans: November 1936 – April 1939’ 7. Mark Thomas (1983), ‘Rearmament and Economic Recovery in the late 1930s’ 8. Stephen Harvey (1985), ‘The Italian War Effort and the Strategic Bombing of Italy’ 9. Mark Harrison (1988), ‘Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938–1945’ 10. T. Balderston (1989), ‘War Finance and Inflation in Britain and Germany 1914–1918’ 11. Timo Toivonen (1998), ‘War and Equality: The Social Background of the Victims of the Finnish Winter War’ PART II VIETNAM 12. Charles Wolf, Jr. (1972), ‘The Logic of Failure: A Vietnam “Lesson”’ 13. B.F. Kiker and Jon Birkeli (1972), ‘Human Capital Losses Resulting from U.S. Casualties of the War in Vietnam’ 14. Mark C. Berger and Barry T. Hirsch (1983), ‘The Civilian Earnings Experience of Vietnam-Era Veterans’ PART III NORTHERN IRELAND 15. Bob Rowthorn (1981), ‘Northern Ireland: An Economy in Crisis’ 16. Jonathan Michie and Maura Sheehan (1998), ‘The Political Economy of a Divided Ireland’ PART IV GULF WAR 17. Murray Wolfson and Robert Smith (1993), ‘How Not to Pay for the War’ PART V MIDDLE EAST 18. Barry M. Blechman (1972), ‘The Impact of Israel’s Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed at Israel’ 19. Pierre Allan and Albert A. Stahel (1983), ‘Tribal Guerrilla Warfare Against a Colonial Power: Analyzing the War in Afghanistan’ 20. Ben D. Mor (1991), ‘Nasser’s Decision-making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rational-choice Explanation’ 21. Jordin S. Cohen, Alex Mintz, Randolph Stevenson and Michael D. Ward (1996), ‘Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Israel: The Indirect Link’ 22. Michael Beenstock (1998), ‘Country Survey XI: Defence and the Israeli Economy’ 23. A. Arnon and J. Weinblatt (2001), ‘Sovereignty and Economic Development: The Case of Israel and Palestine’ PART VI CIVIL WARS 24. Gary M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison (1991), ‘Political Influence on Civil War Mortality Rates: The Electoral College as a Battlefield’ 25. Roy Licklider (1995), ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993’ PART VII WAR FIGHTING 26. Frank L. Klingberg (1966), ‘Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses’ 27. Frederic S. Pearson (1974), ‘Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention’ 28. David Garnham (1986), ‘War-Proneness, War-Weariness, and Regime Type: 1816–1980’ 29. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III (1998), ‘Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness’ Name Index

About the Author :
Edited by Todd Sandler, Vibhooti Shukla Professor, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, US and Keith Hartley, Emeritus Professor, Economics Department, University of York, UK