Ralph Strode studied and taught at Merton College Oxford in the 1350s and ’60s. Later, he lived in London near Geoffrey Chaucer, who dedicated his poem Troilus and Criseyde to “philosophical Strode”. While in Oxford, Strode wrote six treatises on logic, including one on obligationes, a unique logical genre probably designed to train students in logical inference. Obligationes are logical disputations between an Opponent, who poses a proposition, usually false, against a background scenario, and a Respondent who, having accepted the Opponent’s proposal, must respond by granting, denying or doubting the propositions put forward by the Opponent in accordance with certain rules. Various rival sets of rules were proposed. Strode’s treatise argues against three such theories including Swyneshed’s and Dumbleton’s, and develops Walter Burley’s theory further. Jennifer Ashworth began her edition of Strode’s Obligationes in the 1980s, and began an English translation late in life, but was unable to finish the work before her death in 2024. Stephen Read has completed the translation, and added a history of theories of obligationes and the place of Strode’s theory in it. Apart from a doctoral dissertation presenting Strode’s Consequences, it will be the first of Strode’s treatises to appear in print.
Table of Contents:
Preface to the Edition and Translation of Strode’s Obligationes
Introduction A: Ralph Strode 1. Strode’s Life and Works 2. Strode and the Oxford logic 3. Strode’s Logica 4. The Tractatus primus 5. The Tractatus Secundus B: Strode’s Obligationes 1. History of Obligationes 2. The Responsio Antiqua and Responsio Nova 3. Ralph Strode’s Treatise on Obligationes C: Sources for Strode’s Obligationes 1. Manuscripts of the Obligationes 2. The Obligationes in De Principiis Logicalibus 3. Printed Sources of the Obligationes and Consequentie D: Signs and Abbreviations
Ralph Strode, Obligationes (Latin text) I. Prefatio II. Introductio III. Contra Tres Opiniones IV. Contra Primam Suppositionem V. Contra Secundam Suppositionem VI. Contra Tertiam Suppositionem VII. Contra Quartam Suppositionem VIII. Contra Quintam Suppositionem IX. Contra Primam Conclusionem X. Contra Secundam Conclusionem XI. Contra Tertiam Conclusionem XII. Contra Quartam Conclusionem XIII. De Hypotheticis XIV. De Depositione XV. De Impositione XVI. Similes et Dissimiles
Ralph Strode, Obligationes (English translation) I. Preface II. Introduction III. Against Three Theories IV. Against the First Assumption V. Against the Second Assumption VI. Against the Third Assumption VII. Against the Fourth Assumption VIII. Against the Fifth Assumption IX. Against the First Thesis X. Against the Second Thesis XI. Against the Third Thesis XII. Against the Fourth Thesis XIII. On Compound Propositions XIV. On Depositio XV. On Impositio XVI. Similars and Dissimilars
Appendix A Ralph Strode, De Principiis Logicalibus: De Arte Obligatoria (Latin text) I. De Arte Obligatoria II. De Positione III. De Depositione IV. De Impositione Ralph Strode, On Logical Principles: On the Obligatory Art (English translation) I. On the Obligatory Art II. On Positio III. On Depositio IV. On Impositio
Appendix B: John Dumbleton, De Arte Obligatoria John Dumbleton, De Arte Obligatoria (Latin text)
Index
About the Author :
E. Jennifer Ashworth was Distinguished Professor Emerita of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo. She was a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and a member of the British Academy Medieval Texts Editorial Committee. She was an expert in medieval and Renaissance philosophy and had contributed to a number of volumes in the Auctores Britannic Medii Aevi series. She died in 2024. Stephen Read is Professor Emeritus of the History and Philosophy of Logic in the Arché Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology, a member of the St Andrews Institute for Mediaeval Studies, and a member of the British Academy Medieval Texts Editorial Committee. His research concerns the notion of logical consequence and extends from medieval theories in the philosophy of language, mind and logic, to the more modern concerns of relevance logic and the philosophy of logic, in particular, proof-theoretic semantics and the semantic paradoxes.
