About the Book
This book describes and analyses the events surrounding the Soviet Navy Whiskey-class submarine of the Baltic Fleet which ran aground on 27 October 1981 on the south coast of Sweden, close to Naval Base Karlskrona, one of the largest Swedish military bases. The incident triggered a grave diplomatic and military crisis. Upon discovery, Swedish navy and army units quickly surrounded the submarine, and closed off the immediate area. Surveillance of Sweden's sea and land borders intensified. Swedish intelligence stepped up activities against Soviet Navy activities and communications. A tense diplomatic game began over the fate of the stranded submarine and its crew. The Soviets claimed that the submarine had entered Swedish waters by accident, and demanded that it be allowed to leave without further inspection of the vessel or interrogation of its crew. The Swedes demanded further clarification with regard to the submarine's mission and activities. Meanwhile, Swedish technical intelligence concluded that the submarine carried nuclear weapons, ultimately identified as torpedoes with nuclear warheads. The submarine crew took measures to blow up the submarine, in case Swedish special forces would storm the vessel a contingency that the Swedish Armed Forces indeed prepared for. To exacerbate the political and military crisis, Swedish intelligence and naval reconnaissance noted the unannounced arrival of a number of Soviet warships which anchored just outside Swedish territorial waters. The Soviet naval task force, commanded by Vice Admiral Aleksey Kalinin on the destroyer Obraztsovyy eventually consisted of more than ten Soviet warships. In response, Sweden's Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin ordered the Armed Forces to defend the border, should the Soviets attempt a rescue of the stranded submarine. At the time, the international media saw the incident as evidence of extensive Soviet underwater activities in Swedish waters. The Swedish Armed Forces concluded that the violation was deliberate and part of illegal intelligence collection directed against Sweden. Yet, others argued that the violation was due to incompetence and substandard technical equipment rather than a conscious policy of aggression. In this book, Michael Fredholm von Essen describes the submarine incident, and presents new research on what happened based on recently declassified Swedish, Soviet, and U.S. military intelligence archival documents. He details the submarine's voyage into Swedish waters and the confrontation between Swedish and Soviet navy and air force elements He also explains the Soviet naval doctrine and fleet organization that formed the background to the submarine incident and indeed the Soviet Union's global naval stance. AUTHOR: Professor Michael Fredholm von Essen is an historian and former military analyst who has published extensively on the history, defence strategies, security policies, and energy sector developments of Eurasia. He currently is the Head of Research and Development at IRI, an independent research institute. Educated at Uppsala, Stockholm, and Lund Universities, Michael Fredholm von Essen has lectured, including during conferences and as visiting professor, at numerous institutions and universities around the world. He is the author of a large number of books, articles, and academic papers, including Muscovy's Soldiers: The Emergence of the Russian Army, 1462-1689 (Helion, 2018); Charles XI's War: The Scanian War between Sweden and Denmark, 1675-1679 (Helion, 2018); Transnational Organized Crime and Jihadist Terrorism: Russian-Speaking Networks in Western Europe (Routledge, 2017); Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies (Routledge, 2016); Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of War: Persistent Failure of a Rentier State (NIAS, 2018); Eight Banners and Green Flag: The Army of the Manchu Empire and Qing China, 1600-1850 (Pike and Shot Society, 2009); and a large number of articles on early modern warfare in the Arquebusier, the journal of the Pike and Shot Society. 50 b/w photos, 33 colour photos, 18 colour profiles, 10 b/w maps
About the Author :
Professor Michael Fredholm von Essen is an historian and former military analyst who has published extensively on the history, defence strategies, security policies, and energy sector developments of Eurasia. He currently is the Head of Research and Development at IRI, an independent research institute. Educated at Uppsala, Stockholm, and Lund Universities, Michael Fredholm von Essen has lectured, including during conferences and as visiting professor, at numerous institutions and universities around the world. He is the author of a large number of books, articles, and academic papers, including Muscovy’s Soldiers: The Emergence of the Russian Army, 1462-1689 (Helion, 2018); Charles XI’s War: The Scanian War between Sweden and Denmark, 1675-1679 (Helion, 2018); Transnational Organized Crime and Jihadist Terrorism: Russian-Speaking Networks in Western Europe (Routledge, 2017); Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies (Routledge, 2016); Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of War: Persistent Failure of a Rentier State (NIAS, 2018); Eight Banners and Green Flag: The Army of the Manchu Empire and Qing China, 1600-1850 (Pike and Shot Society, 2009); and a large number of articles on early modern warfare in the Arquebusier, the journal of the Pike and Shot Society.
