Comparative Institutional Analysis: Theory, Corporations and East Asia. Selected Papers of Masahiko Aoki

This volume collects 22 articles by Masahiko Aoki, selected from writings published over the course of his 45-year academic career. These fascinating essays cover a range of issues, including mechanism design, comparative governance, corporate governance, institutions and institutional change, but are tied together by a focus on East Asia and a comparative institutional framework.Specific topics include the early stages of mechanism design theory, comparative analysis of vertical, horizontal and modular industrial coordination and its applications, cooperative game-theoretic approaches to the diversity of corporate government structure, the endogenous nature of institutions, and comparative and historical analysis of institutions in Japan, China and Korea. Students, professors and scholars with an interest in comparative institutional studies and East Asian studies will find this book a useful and illuminating resource.

Table of Contents:
Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Masahiko Aoki PART I COMPARATIVE MECHANISM DESIGN A Quality vs. Price in Non-Neoclassical Environments 1. Masahiko Aoki (1970), ‘A Note on Marshallian Process Under Increasing Returns’ 2. Masahiko Aoki (1971), ‘Marshallian External Economies and Optimal Tax-Subsidy Structure’ 3. Masahiko Aoki (1971), ‘Two Planning Processes for an Economy with Production Externalities’ 4. Masahiko Aoki (1971), ‘An Investment Planning Process for an Economy with Increasing Returns’ B Vertical, Horizontal and Modular Coordination 5. Masahiko Aoki (1986), ‘Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm’ 6. Masahiko Aoki (1998), ‘The Evolution of Organizational Conventions and Gains from Diversity’ 7. Masahiko Aoki and Hirokazu Takizawa (2002), ‘Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model’ 8. Masahiko Aoki and Geoffrey Rothwell (2013), ‘A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: Lessons and Policy Implications’ PART II THE DIVERSITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A COOPERATIVE GAME APPROACH 9. Masahiko Aoki (1980), ‘A Model of the Firm as a Stockholder–Employee Cooperative Game’ 10. Masahiko Aoki (1982), ‘Equilibrium Growth of the Hierarchical Firm: Shareholder–Employee Cooperative Game Approach’ 11. Masahiko Aoki (1983), ‘Managerialism Revisited in the Light of Bargaining-Game Theory’ 12. Masahiko Aoki (2012), ‘A Shapley-Value Parable of Corporations as Evolutive Systems of Associational Cognition’ PART III ANALYSIS OF THE ENDOGENOUS NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS 13. Masahiko Aoki (1996), ‘Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative Theorizing’ 14. Masahiko Aoki (1994), ‘The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementarity’ 15. Masahiko Aoki (2010), ‘“Individual” Social Capital, “Social” Networks, and Their Linkages to Economic Game’ 16. Masahiko Aoki (2007), ‘Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Changes’ 17. Masahiko Aoki (2011), ‘Institutions as Cognitive Media between Strategic Interactions and Individual Beliefs’ PART IV INSTITUTIONS IN EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 18. Masahiko Aoki (1990), ‘Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm’ 19. Masahiko Aoki (1994), ‘Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Bank System: An Analytical and Developmental View’ 20. Masahiko Aoki (1994), ‘Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition Economies’ 21. Masahiko Aoki, Kevin Murdock and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (2009), ‘Beyond The East Asian Miracle: Introducing the Market-Enhancing View’ 22. Masahiko Aoki (2013), ‘Historical Sources of Institutional Trajectories in Economic Development: China, Japan and Korea Compared’

About the Author :
The late Masahiko Aoki, formerly Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor of Japanese Studies, Professor of Economics, Emeritus and Senior Fellow, Stanford University, US and former President, International Economic Association