Excusable Evil: An Analysis of Complete Defenses in International Criminal Law(50 School of Human Rights Research)

Could Hitler have pleaded insanity? Can a soldier participating in a massacre claim duress because his superior forced him? In domestic criminal law complete defenses, such as insanity and duress, are relatively common legal concepts. But what is the role of these arguments in international criminal law? Can horrific large-scale crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, ever be excused? This book provides an analysis of cases featuring complete defenses before international criminal courts (IMT, IMTFE, ICTY, ICTR and ICC). The conclusion of the analysis is that international criminal courts recognize most complete defenses in principle. However, they consistently reject them in practice. Courts thus tend to say: "Insanity is available as a complete defense - but not in this case". This conclusion raises questions as to the compatibility between complete defenses and international crimes: When they are never accepted in practice, should such defenses be available at all? The final Part of the book answers this question in the affirmative and provides recommendations on the contents of complete defenses in the field of international criminal justice.

Table of Contents:
Part I A Theory of Complete Defenses Chapter I Introduction 1. Excusable evil? 2. Relevance of the key question 3. Key question: Definitions 3.1. Complete defenses 3.2. International crimes 3.2.1. International crimes in general 3.2.2. Genocide 3.2.3. Crimes against humanity 3.2.4. War crimes 3.2.5. Aggression 4. Further delineation of present research 4.1. International courts 4.2. Sources of international criminal law 4.2.1. Sources of the active ad hoc tribunals 4.2.2. Article 21 of the ICC Statute 4.2.3. Sources of international criminal law included in this research 4.3. Currency of the manuscript 5. Structure and method Chapter II A theoretical background on complete defenses 1. Introduction 2. "I did it": the general requirements for criminal liability 2.1. General requirements for criminal liability 2.1.1. Objective element 2.1.2. Subjective element 3. "But I should not be punished": Complete defenses and criminal liability 3.1. Confession and avoidance 3.2. Negation of the subjective element 3.3. Conclusion 4. Categorization of defenses: Justifications and excuses 4.1. Justi.cations, excuses and the relationship between complete defenses and the general requirements for criminal liability 5. Procedural issues related to complete defenses 5.1. Grounds stated in judgments 5.2. Burden and standard of proof 5.3. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski 6. Conclusion Part II Complete Defenses in Practice Introduction Part II Chapter III Self-defense 1. Introduction 2. Self-defense in the Nuremberg Judgment 2.1. The verdict on Erich Raeder 2.1.1. Relevant passages 2.1.2. Applicability 2.1.3. Scope 2.1.4. Nature of self-defense 3. Self-defense in the Tokyo Judgment 3.1. Relevant passages 3.1.1. The general part of the Judgment 3.1.2. The Verdict on Shigetaro Shimada, Hideki Tojo, Shigenori Togo 3.2. Analysis of self-defense in the Tokyo Judgment 3.2.1. Applicability 3.2.2. Scope 3.2.3 Nature of self-defense 4. Self-defense at the ICTY 4.1. Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez 4.1.1. Relevant passages 4.1.2. Applicability 4.1.3. Scope 4.1.4. Nature of self-defense 4.2. Prosecutor v. Stakic 4.2.1. Relevant passages 4.2.2. Applicability and scope 4.2.3. Nature of self-defense 4.3. Prosecutor v. Galic 4.3.1. Relevant passages 4.3.2. Applicability 4.3.3. Scope 4.3.4. Nature of self-defense 4.4. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovic and Kubura 4.4.1. Relevant passages 4.4.2. Analysis 4.5. Prosecutor v. Strugar 4.5.1. Relevant passages 4.5.2. Applicability 4.5.3. Scope 4.5.4. Nature of self-defense 4.6. Prosecutor v. Delic 4.6.1. Relevant passages 4.6.2. Applicability 4.6.3. Scope 4.6.4. Nature of self-defense 4.7. Prosecutor v. Milan Martic 4.7.1. Relevant passages 4.7.2. Applicability 4.7.3. Scope 4.7.4. Nature of self-defense 4.8. Prosecutor v. Boskoski and Tarculovski 4.8.1. Relevant passages 4.8.2. Applicability 4.8.3. Scope 4.8.4. Nature of self-defense 4.9. Prosecutor v. Dordevic 4.9.1. Relevant passages 4.9.2. Applicability 4.9.3. Nature of self-defense 4.10. Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al. 4.10.1. Relevant passages 4.10.2. Applicability 4.10.3. Scope 4.10.4. Nature of self-defense 5. ICC 5.1. Applicability 5.2. Scope 5.3. Nature of self-defense 6. Analysis of self-defense 6.1. Applicability 6.2. Scope 6.3. Nature of self-defense 6.3.1. Self-defense in the sphere of ius ad bellum 6.3.2. Private self-defense 6.4. Categorization 6.5. Conclusion on self-defense 6.6. Preview Part III Chapter IV Consent 1. Introduction 2. Consent in the Nuremberg Judgment 2.1. The general part of the Nuremberg Judgment in conjunction with the verdict on Konstantin von Neurath 2.1.1. Relevant passages 2.1.2. Applicability 2.1.3. Scope 3. Consent at the ICTY 3.1. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al 3.1.1. Relevant passages 3.1.2. Analysis 4. Consent at the ICTR 4.1. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi 4.1.1. Relevant passages 4.1.2. Analysis 5. Consent at the ICC 6. Analysis of consent 6.1. Applicability 6.2. Scope 6.3. Categorization 6.4. Conclusion on consent 6.5. Preview Part III Chapter V Insanity 1. Introduction 2. Insanity at the Nuremberg Tribunal 2.1. The verdict on Rudolf Hess 2.1.1. Relevant passages 2.1.2. Analysis 2.1.3. Expert examination and legal consequences 3. Insanity at the ICTY 3.1. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic 3.1.1. Relevant passages 3.1.2. Analysis 3.2. Prosecutor v. Mucic et al 3.2.1. Relevant passages 3.2.2. Applicability 3.2.3. Scope 3.2.4. Expert examination and legal consequences 4. Insanity at the ICTR 5. Insanity at the ICC 5.1. Applicability 5.2. Scope 5.3. Expert examination and legal consequences 6. Analysis of insanity 6.1. Applicability 6.2. Scope 6.3. Categorization 6.4. Expert examination and legal consequences 6.4.1. Expert examination 6.4.2. Legal consequences 6.5. Conclusion on insanity 6.6. Preview Part III Chapter VI Intoxication 1. Introduction 2. Intoxication at the ICTY 2.1. Relevant passages 2.2. Analysis of ICTY case law on intoxication 3. Intoxication at the ICTR 3.1. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda 3.1.1. Relevant passages 3.1.2. Analysis 4. Intoxication at the ICC 4.1. Applicability 4.2. Scope 5. Analysis of intoxication 5.1. Applicability 5.2. Scope 5.3. Voluntary and involuntary intoxication 5.4. Categorization 5.5. Conclusion on intoxication Preview Part III Chapter VII Mistake 1. Introduction 2. Mistake at Nuremberg 2.1. Hermann Goring and Erich Raeder: Crimes Against Peace (Mistake of fact) 2.1.1. Relevant passages 2.1.2. Applicability 2.1.3. Scope 2.2. The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia 2.2.1. Relevant passages 2.2.2. Applicability 2.2.3. Scope 3. Mistake at the ICTY 3.1. Prosecutor v. Mucic et al 3.1.1. Relevant passages 3.1.2. Applicability 3.1.3. Scope 3.2. Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic 3.2.1. Relevant passages 3.2.2. Analysis 3.2.3. Scope 3.3. Mistake of fact mentioned in other cases 4. Mistake at the ICTR 5. Mistake at the ICC 5.1. Applicability 5.2. Scope 5.2.1. The distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law 5.2.2. Mistake of fact (article 32(1)) 5.2.3. Mistake of law 5.2.4. General comments on article 32 5.2.5. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo 6. Analysis of mistake 6.1. Applicability: Mistake of fact 6.2. Applicability: Mistake of law 6.3. Scope: Mistake of fact 6.4. Scope: Mistake of law 6.5. Categorization 6.6. Conclusion on mistake 6.7. Preview Part III Chapter VIII Superior orders and prescription of law 1. Introduction 2. Superior orders and prescription of law in the Nuremberg Judgment 3. Superior orders and prescription of law in the Tokyo Judgment 4. Superior orders and prescription of law at the ICTY 5. Superior orders and prescription of law at the ICTR 6. Superior orders and prescription of law at the ICC 6.1. Applicability 6.2. Scope 6.3. Relationship with article 32 6.4. Superior orders and superior responsibility 7. Analysis of superior orders 7.1. Applicability 7.2. Scope 7.3. Categorization 7.4. Respondeat superior or strict liability? 7.5. Conclusion on superior orders 7.6. Preview Part III Chapter IX Necessity and duress 1. Introduction 2. Nuremberg 2.1. The general part of the Judgment: Plunder 2.1.1. Relevant passages 2.1.2. Applicability 2.1.3. Scope 2.1.4. Necessity/duress 2.2. The verdict on Karl Donitz 2.2.1. Relevant passages 2.2.2. Applicability 2.2.3. Scope 2.2.4. Necessity/duress 3. Tokyo 3.1. The verdict on Shigenori Togo 3.1.1. Relevant passages 3.1.2. Applicability 3.1.3. Scope 3.1.4. Necessity/duress 3.2. The verdict on Kenji Dohihara 3.2.1. Relevant passages 3.2.2. Applicability 3.2.3. Scope 3.2.4. Necessity/duress 3.3. The verdict on Seishiro Itagaki 3.3.1. Relevant passages 3.3.2. Applicability 3.3.3. Scope 3.3.4. Necessity/duress 3.4. The Verdict on Iwane Matsui 3.4.1. Relevant passages 3.4.2. Applicability 3.4.3. Scope 3.4.4. Necessity/duress 4. Necessity and duress at the ICTY 4.1. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic 4.1.1. The facts of the case 4.1.2. Trial Chamber I 4.1.3. Appeals Chamber, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah and Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li 4.1.4. Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese 4.1.5. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen 4.1.6. Trial Chamber II 4.1.7. Conclusion on Prosecutor v. Erdemovic 4.2. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski 4.2.1. Relevant passages 4.2.2. Applicability 4.2.3. Scope 4.2.4. Necessity/duress 4.3. Kvocka et al 4.3.1. Relevant passages 4.3.2. Applicability 4.3.3. Scope 4.3.4. Necessity/duress 4.4. Other ICTY references to necessity/duress 5. Necessity and duress at the ICTR 5.1. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli 5.1.1. Relevant passages 5.1.2. Applicability 5.1.3. Scope 5.1.4. Necessity/duress 5.2. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda 5.2.1. Relevant passages 5.2.2. Applicability 5.2.3. Scope 5.2.4. Necessity/duress 5.3. Other ICTR references to necessity/duress 6. Necessity and duress at the ICC 6.1. Applicability 6.2. Scope 6.3. Necessity/duress 7. Analysis of necessity/duress 7.1. Applicability 7.1.1. In principle 7.1.2. In casu 7.1.3. Mitigation 7.1.4. Other legal consequences 7.2. Scope 7.3. Necessity/duress 7.4. Categorization 7.5. Conclusion on necessity/duress 7.6. Preview Part III Chapter X Belligerent reprisals 1. Introduction 2. Reprisals at the ICTY 2.1. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic 2.1.1. Facts of the case 2.1.2. Applicability 2.1.3. Scope 2.2. Prosecutor v. Milan Martic 2.2.1. Facts of the case 2.2.2. Applicability 2.2.3. Scope 3. Reprisals at the ICC 4. Analysis of reprisals 4.1. Applicability 4.2. Scope 4.3. Categorization 4.4. Conclusion on reprisals 4.5. Preview Part III Chapter XI Tu quoque 1. Introduction 2. Tu quoque at Nuremberg 2.1. The verdict on Karl Donitz 2.1.1. Relevant passages 2.1.2. Applicability 2.1.3. Scope 2.2. The verdict on Erich Raeder 2.3. Other sources on tu quoque at Nuremberg 3. Tu quoque at the IMTFE 4. Tu quoque at the ICTY 4.1. Prosecutor vs. Kupreskic 4.1.1. Facts of the case 4.1.2. Applicability 4.1.3. Scope 4.2. Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez 4.2.1. Relevant passages 4.2.2. Applicability 4.2.3. Scope 4.3. Prosecutor v. Milan Martic 4.3.1. Relevant passages 4.3.2. Applicability 4.3.3. Scope 4.4. Other sources on tu quoque at the ICTY 5. Tu quoque at the ICTR 5.1. Prosecutor vs. Bagosora et al 5.1.1. Relevant passages 5.1.2. Applicability 6. Tu quoque at the ICC 7. Analysis of tu quoque 7.1. Applicability and scope 7.2. Categorization 7.3. Conclusion on tu quoque 7.4. Preview Part III Chapter XII Other possible complete defenses in international criminal law 1. Introduction 2. Other possible complete defenses at the ICTY and ICTR 3. Other possible complete defenses at the ICC 4. Conclusion 5. Preview Part III Analysis Part II Analysis of complete defenses in international criminal law in general 1. Introduction 2. General recognition of complete defenses 3. How are defenses raised? 4. The applicability of complete defenses 5. A priori rejection: Reasons 5.1. Self-defense ad bellum 5.2. Consent 5.3. Superior Orders 5.4. Necessity/duress 5.5. Reprisals 5.6. Tu quoque 5.7. Conclusion on reasons for a priori rejection 6. Recognition in principle (explicit recognition) 7. Grounds for rejection on merits (implicit recognition) 7.1. Self-defense 7.2. Consent 7.3. Insanity 7.4. Mistake 7.5. Necessity/duress 7.6. Reprisals 7.7. Conclusion 8. Complete defenses and mitigating circumstances 9. Legal consequences of complete defenses 10. The scope of complete defenses 10.1. Requirements 10.2. Analysis of the scope of complete defenses 11. Categorization of complete defenses 12. Concluding remarks Part III Recommendations Introduction Part III Chapter XIII Should complete defenses apply to international crimes? 1. Introduction 2. Arguments pro the availability of complete defenses in international criminal law 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Individual criminal responsibility 2.3. Customary status 2.4. Objectives of criminal law 2.5. Availability under national law 2.6. Credibility of international criminal courts 3. Arguments contra complete defenses in international criminal law 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Ethical reasons 3.2.1. Introduction 3.2.2. The abhorrent nature of international crimes 3.2.3. Absolute character of international crimes 3.2.4. Meeting the requirements of complete defenses in case of international crimes 3.3. Technical arguments 3.4. Practical arguments 3.4.1. Big .sh 3.4.2. System criminality 3.4.3. Acquittal is not a popular option 3.4.4. Guilty pleas 3.4.5. Practice 3.4.6. Discussion 3.5. Conclusion Chapter XIV How should complete defenses be applied under international criminal law (in general)? 1. Introduction 2. A system of complete defenses? 3. A system of complete defenses: The basics 3.1. A distinction between justi.cations and excuses 3.2. The de.nition of justi.cation and excuse 3.2.1. Justi.cations: The de.nition from case law 3.2.2. Excuses: The de.nition from case law 3.3. The de.nition of justi.cations and excuses 3.3.1. Justi.cations 3.3.2. Excuses 3.3.3. A model of justi.cations and excuses 4. The effect of justi.cations and excuses on the crime charged 5. Failed complete defenses in mitigation 6. Conclusion Chapter XV How should complete defenses be applied under international criminal law (for each defense)? 1. Introduction 2. Self-defense 3. Consent 4. Insanity 5. Intoxication 6. Mistake 7. Superior orders 8. Necessity/duress 9. Lawful belligerent reprisals 10. Tu quoque 11. Other possible defenses in international criminal law 12. Conclusion Chapter XVI Summary and conclusion Part I Theory Part II Practice Part III Recommendations 369 Final Words

About the Author :
Maartje Krabbe is a researcher and lecturer at the department of criminal law and criminology of the Radboud University in Nijmegen, The Netherlands. From 2004 to 2012 she worked at Maastricht University, where she taught tort law, substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, comparative criminal law and international criminal law. During this appointment Krabbe carried out several research projects in the field of international criminal law. One of these projects resulted in the Ph.D. thesis Excusable Evil: An Analysis of Complete Defenses in International Criminal Law (Intersentia, 2014), which was supervised by Prof. André Klip and Prof. Gerard de Jonge. Krabbe's research interests lie, among others, in the area of complete defenses, criminal liability, international criminal law and comparative criminal law.