Ebb and Flow: Maintaining the Close Air Support (Cas) Relationship Through History - Detailed Case Studies of World War II, Korean War, Vietnam and Gulf War, War

Military historians have thoroughly documented the longstanding debate between American airmen and ground forces over Close Air Support (CAS). Discord between services, particularly during inter-war periods, has repeatedly resulted in poor CAS preparation and therefore poor performance in the early stages of America's conflicts. Measuring this CAS relationship both before and through conflict in terms of doctrine, training, and personal relationships reveals an additional trend. During World War II, the Korean War, and Operation Enduring Freedom, personal relationships improved and shared objectives emerged as a result of daily interaction between airmen and ground forces. The changes enabled those involved to rebuild the CAS relationship and improve performance in the later years of these conflicts. Regrettably, subsequent declines in the CAS relationship during interwar periods have created a consistent cycle of ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Both services must break this cycle of ebb and flow so that the U.S. military arrives at its next conflict with a properly maintained CAS relationship. CAS performance is inextricably linked to integration, making relationships the essential foundation of combat results. Restoring the CAS relationship can be as simple as airmen and ground forces occupying the same mess tent, in training as well as in combat. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. World War II 3. The Korean War 4. Vietnam and the Gulf War 5. The War in Afghanistan 6. Cross Case Analysis 7. Conclusion From World War I to the present day, American ground forces and airmen have argued over the ideal employment of scarce resources in training, equipment, and sorties. Their debate has often centered on one particularly contentious issue: Close Air Support (CAS). A series of formal agreements and doctrine revisions tells a familiar narrative of begrudging compromise between airmen searching for the most effective use of airpower across a range of mission types and troops who needed fixed wing CAS to maneuver-or even survive. Most commentators echo Major Patrick Gallogy's sentiment that "This rancorous debate and discourse regarding CAS has pervaded most of its history." However, on closer examination, a definable ebb and flow emerged in the CAS relationship that exists between airmen and the ground troops that they support from the sky. American airmen and ground forces made great strides in CAS capability in World War II, only to forget these lessons until they struggled to relearn them during the Korean War. Similar CAS struggles at the start of the Vietnam War and Operation Enduring freedom reveal the cyclical nature of this recurring fluctuation. During times of war, troops in contact with the enemy required CAS, and both parties sought to improve the CAS relationship as they strove toward common goals. Close personal relationships between air and ground leaders often spurred this improvement in the CAS relationship. Between wars, however, resource constraints, internal service concerns, complacency, and physical separation caused the priorities of airmen and ground forces to diverge. They planned separately with their own worst-case scenarios and service priorities for an uncertain future. This usually resulted in a lack of teamwork and low prioritization by Army and Air Force leaders for joint endeavors like CAS; evidenced by failures in doctrine, training, and personal relationships. As a result, the CAS relationship between airmen and ground troops fractured, forcing and both parties to waste time, money, and lives rebuilding that relationship during the next conflict. Unfortunately, that cycle persists today.