Strategy of Unity: Eisenhower, the British, and Multinational Operations in World War II - From the Defeat at Kasserine Pass to Final Attack on the Elbe River, Conflic

With the largest army a U.S. general has ever commanded, General Dwight D. Eisenhower led the Allied forces from their first landings in North Africa to their ultimate victory in Europe. To do this, he had to build unity of effort, particularly with the British, toward a common purpose. This monograph explores Eisenhower's ability to conduct multinational ground operations with the British in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations in World War II. Using the integrated multinational command structure and the tenets of multinational operations of rapport, trust and confidence, and mission focus, Eisenhower's performance in the Tunisian Campaign is compared to his performance in the European Theater of Operations, arguing that he learned from his mistakes and thus improved his abilities. From the defeat at Kasserine Pass in 1943 to the final attack to the Elbe River in 1945, Eisenhower used unity of effort as his guiding principle, basing almost all decisions on how they would impact the alliance. He further developed his integrated command structure based on subordinates', superiors', and his own abilities to employ the tenets of multinational operations. These lessons may prove insightful as the U.S. Army shifts its focus to near-peer threats and large-scale combat operations.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.For two weeks in December 1944, the Allies resisted Germany's thrust through the Ardennes. Known as the Battle of the Bulge, the attack caught the Allies off-guard, creating a sixty mile salient in the Allied lines. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was decisive in his response. He ordered Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.'s Third Army to halt its advance on Saarbriicken, which then slammed into the southern flank of the German salient. He then directed Lieutenant General Omar Bradley to detach his First and Ninth Armies from his Twelfth Army Group to support Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group and its attack on the German northern flank. The two army groups formed a pincer that threatened to encircle the German forces in the bulge, forcing them to withdraw. The Allies had stopped Germany's last major offensive in the west. Displaying superb leadership, Eisenhower brought his armies together in a moment of unity to defeat the Axis offensive. However, Eisenhower's transfer of Bradley's two armies to Montgomery opened a festering wound in the alliance. For Operation Overlord, the June 1944 cross-channel invasion of continental Europe, he chose Montgomery as the commander of ground forces for all nationalities. Though against the practice of independent U.S. armies, Eisenhower saw the necessity to simplify congested ground operations. Once the Allies established a lodgment in August 1944, Eisenhower created the U.S. Twelfth Army Group with Bradley as its commander. This act created two army groups, making Montgomery and Bradley equals. To effectively manage two equal multinational forces, Eisenhower took command of land operations. However, Montgomery had a taste of command for the whole front, and with the acquisition of the two U.S. armies during the Battle of the Bulge, he would force the issue of command in late December 1944.