Panzer Operations: Germany'S Panzer Group 3 During the Invasion of Russia, 1941(11 Die Wehrmacht im Kampf)

Account of 3rd Panzer Group in Operation Barbarossa, written by commanding officer, Hermann Hoth. Hermann Hoth led Germany's 3rd Panzer Group in Army Group Center - in tandem with Guderian's 2nd Group - during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Together, the two panzer commanders achieved a series of astounding victories, encircling entire Russian armies at Minsk, Smolensk, and Vyazma, up to the very gates of Moscow. In this work, originally published in German in 1956, Hoth discusses his exact command decisions during Barbarossa to reveal new insights into how Germany could have succeeded. Hoth sheds light on the decisive struggle between Hitler and his military advisers on the question whether, after the Dnieper and the Dvina had been reached, to adhere to the original idea of capturing Moscow. Hoth's first-hand analysis is vital reading for every student of World War II. AUTHOR: Hermann Hoth (1885-1971) began Workd War II in command of a motorized corps. During Operation Barbarossa he commander Panzer Group 3 of Army Group Center, and toward the end of 1941 was promoted to command of 17th Army. In June 1942 he was given command of 4th Panzer Army. In 1943, following the battle of Kursk, he was relieved of command. After serving six years in prison following the Nuremberg Trials, Hoth turned to writing and died at age 85 in Goslar, Germany.

About the Author :
Hermann Hoth (1885-1971) began World War II in command of a motorized corps. During Operation Barbarossa he commander Panzer Group 3 of Army Group Center, and toward the end of 1941 was promoted to command of 17th Army. In June 1942 he was given command of 4th Panzer Army. In 1943, following the battle of Kursk, he was relieved of command. After serving six years in prison following the Nuremberg Trials, Hoth turned to writing and died at age 85 in Goslar, Germany. Linden Lyons holds a master’s degree in history from Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. He studied German at the University of Freiburg and librarianship at the University of Canberra. He is the translator of several titles in the Die Wehrmacht im Kampf series, most recently Counter-Strike Operations, Normandy, and Rome to the Po River.

Review :
A useful study on how the German leadership failed to provide adequate logistical support to capitalise on the breakthroughs made by the Panzer divisions. Hoth produced a more balanced view of the fighting that some of his contemporaries. The standard line taken by many German generals was that Hitler's decisions were almost always wrong, and if he had only left the direction of the war to them, then the result would have been different. Hoth, at least in the mid 1950s when this book was written, was more willing to admit that sometimes Hitler had a valid point, and some of his orders produced significant German victories. The appendices include actual operational orders, but (unlike Guderian’s book Panzer Leader) this is not a memoir - it is a masterclass in what happened and how to command armour. For that reason alone it should be bought and read by anyone who thinks they know about tanks, command or staff work as well as those with an interest in military history. 5 stars. It is interesting in seeing how a senior commander viewed the machinations of higher command and the impact on campaign performance.