An Introduction to Epistemology - Second Edition

The second edition of Jack Crumley’s An Introduction to Epistemology strikes a balance between the many issues that engage contemporary epistemologists and the contributions of the major historical figures. He shows not only how philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant foreground the contemporary debates, but also why they deserve consideration on their own terms. A substantial revision of the first edition, the second edition is even more accessible to students. The new edition includes recent work on contextualism, evidentialism, externalism and internalism, and perceptual realism; as well, the chapter on coherence theory is substantially revised, reflecting recent developments in that area. New to this second edition is a chapter on feminist epistemology, which includes discussions of major positions and themes, such as feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint epistemology, postmodern epistemology, and feminist critiques of objectivity. It presents the important contributions of philosophers such as Sandra Harding, Helen Longino, Genevieve Lloyd, and others. Each chapter ends with a list of study questions and readings for further study.

Table of Contents:
Preface to the First Edition Preface to the Second Edition Introduction The Aims of Epistemology Some Important Concepts Tradition and Revision Key Concepts CHAPTER ONE Skepticism First Skirmishes with Skepticism Cartesian Skepticism Box: Academic and Pyhrronian Skepticism The Dream Argument The Demon Argument The Skeptic’s Requirements Hume, Skepticism, and Entitlement Hume’s Assumptions The Rationality of Our Inductive Inferences Box: Types of Induction Hume and Common Sense Box: Reasons and Causes Skepticism and the Defense of our Cognitive Practices Is Skepticism Inevitable? Two Types of Defense Responding to the Skeptic Is Certainty Necessary for Knowledge? Box: Descartes and the Probable Show-and-Tell: Ruling Out That One Is Dreaming Contextualism: Shifting Standards Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation Induction Again Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER TWO An Introduction to the Analysis of Knowledge The Traditional Analysis Truth Conditions Motivating the Traditional Analysis Box: Theories of Truth Gettier and the Traditional Analysis Gettier-type Counterexamples Box: Bertrand Russell and Gettier-type Counterexamples A Defense of the Traditional Analysis Some Strategies for Handling Gettier Problems A General Diagnosis Causal Theories Indefeasibility Theories Box: Strong and Weak Conditions No-False-Premise Views The Significance of Gettier Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER THREE Reliabilism Reliability and Knowledge Two Versions of Reliabilism Reliabilism and Perceptual Knowledge Box: More on Reliable Indicator Theory Reliabilism and the Traditional Analysis Reliabilism and Justification Objections to Reliabilism The Generality Problem Identifying Process Types Is Reliability Sufficient? Evil Demons—Again Reliabilist Responses and Revisions Normal Worlds and Weak Justification Box: Reliabilism and Skepticism Clairvoyancy Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER FOUR Structure and Sources of Justification: Foundationalism The Regress Argument Motives For Foundationalism Options for the Regress Argument A Motive for Foundationalism Two Types of Foundationalism The Basic Structure Box: Foundationalism as a Theory of Knowledge Strong Foundationalism Neoclassical Foundationalism Modest Foundationalism Box: Can Reliabilists Be Foundationalists? Features of Modest Foundationalism Objections To Foundationalism Strong Foundationalism and Basic Beliefs Levels of Justification Independent Information and Modest Foundationalism The Cognitive Status of Experience Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER FIVE Structure and Sources of Justification: Coherence Theory The Intuitive Idea Mutual Support Two Views of Coherence Box: Linear Coherence Coherence, Perception, and Belief The Nature of Coherence Perceptual Beliefs and Coherence What Do You Believe? Box: Is the Doxastic Presumption True? “Cycles and Loops” Lehrer’s View of Coherence Justifying Trustworthiness Objections to Coherence Theory: Liberal or Conservative? Liberality Conservatism The Isolation Objection Box: The Isolation Objection and Its Cousins Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER SIX Externalism and Internalism Externalist and Internalist Features of Justification Epistemic Responsibility Responsibility: Goals and Means Are Beliefs Voluntary? Box: Doxastic Voluntarism Cognitive Access Strong and Weak Accessibility Objections and Responses Attempted Reconciliation Alston’s Internalist Externalism Sosa’s Virtue Perspectivism Box: Do Externalists Change the Subject? Prospects for Reconciliation Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER SEVEN Naturalized Epistemology Tradition and Naturalism A Traditional Picture Naturalism and Epistemology Box: Facts and Values Quine’s Vew of Naturalized Epistemology First Philosophy Box: Quine and the Rejection of the A Priori The Normative Character of Naturalized Epistemology Box: Science Studies Science: The Strong Programme The Goal of Inquiry The Goal of Inquiry: Normative and Natural Box: Evolutionary Epistemology Naturalized Epistemology and Supervenience Tradition, Reduction, and Supervenience Quinean and Modest Naturalized Epistemology Three Options Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER EIGHT Feminist Epistemology Traditional Epistemology, Science, and Knowledge Products Scientific Method and Values Objectivity Should We Want Objectivity? Reason A New Look for Epistemology Feminist Empiricism Box: Coherentism and Feminist Epistemology Feminist Standpoint Epistemology Feminist Naturalized Epistemology Does Feminist Epistemology Look Different? Box: Ecological Naturalism The “Feminist” in “Feminist Epistemology” Feminist Epistemology in a Chapter Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER NINE A Priori Knowledge The A Priori and Necessity An Epistemological Distinction: A Priori and A Posteriori A Metaphysical Distinction: Necessary and Contingent Propositions Historical Theories of the A Priori The Traditional Theory of A Priori Knowledge Box: The Principle of Contradiction Kant and the Synthetic A Priori Box: Hume and Kant on Analytic and Synthetic Judgments (Propositions) Contemporary Views of the A Priori Linguistic Accounts of the A Priori The Traditional, the Linguistic, and the Truth Quinean Reservations Necessity and the A Priori No Experience Required: Synthetic A Priori Propositions Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study CHAPTER TEN Perception The Simple Story: Naïve Realism Naïve—An Illusion? Further Arguments Against Naïve Realism Box: Blindsight? The World of Sense Data An Intuitive Approach Some Common Features Representative Realism Primary and Secondary Qualities A Lockean Response or No Way Out? Science to the Rescue? Some Reactions to Representative Realism Phenomenalism Berkeley’s Factual Phenomenalism Linguistic Phenomenalism Is Linguistic Phenomenalism Plausible? Box: Linguistic Phenomenalism and the Skeptic Berkeley Again Reviving Direct Realism Adverbial Theory The Doxastic View Perceptual Experience and Realism Key Concepts Review Questions For Further Study Glossary Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Jack S. Crumley II is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the philosophy department at the University of San Diego.

Review :
“The second edition of Crumley’s An Introduction to Epistemology offers readers a clearly written, highly accessible, comprehensive, and insightful up-to-date introduction to the main issues, concepts, and players in contemporary Anglo-American epistemology.” — James Maffie, Colorado State University “ … an outstanding resource for students and instructors at both introductory and advanced levels.” — Patrick Rysiew, University of Victoria