Spheres of Intervention: US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967–1976

In Spheres of Intervention, James R. Stocker examines the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Lebanon during a transformational period for Lebanon and a time of dynamic changes in US policy toward the Middle East. Drawing on tens of thousands of pages of declassified materials from US archives and a variety of Arabic and other non-English sources, Stocker provides a new interpretation of Lebanon's slide into civil war, as well as insight into the strategy behind US diplomatic initiatives toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. During this period, Stocker argues, Lebanon was often a pawn in the games of larger powers. The stability of Lebanon was an aim of US policy at a time when Israel's borders with Egypt and Jordan were in active contention. Following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the internal political situation in Lebanon became increasingly unstable due to the regional military and political stalemate, the radicalization of the country's domestic politics, and the appearance of Palestinian militias on Lebanese territory. US officials were more deeply involved in Lebanese affairs than most outside the region realized. After a series of internal crises in 1969, 1970, and 1973, civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1975. The conflict reached a temporary halt after a Syrian military intervention the following year, but this was only an end to the first stage of what would be a sixteen-year civil war. During these crises, the US sought to help the Lebanese government in a variety of ways, including providing military aid to the Lebanese military, convincing Arab countries to take measures to help the Lebanese government, mediating Lebanon's relations with Israel, and even supporting certain militias.

Table of Contents:
Introduction: "This Is the American Policy" US Interests in Lebanon Causes of the Lebanese Civil War The Course of the Conflict, 1975–76 1. Sparks in the Tinderbox: The United States, the June War, and the Remaking of the Lebanese Crisis Lebanese Domestic Tensions on the Eve of the June War The United States and Lebanon in the 1960s Lebanon's Six Day War Pepsi-Cola Hits the Spot The Beirut Airport Raid 2. Compromise in Cairo: The Nixon Administration and the Cairo Agreement "Trying to Be Helpful" The August Attacks and the Rogers Plan October Crisis and the Cairo Agreement 3. From Cairo to Amman: The United States and Lebanese Internal Security Post-Cairo US Assistance to Lebanon Implementing the Cairo Agreement The Kahhale Ambush and the Exodus from the South Causes of the Calm 4. Plus ça change: International Terrorism, Détente, and the May 1973 Crisis The New International Terrorism A New Request for Support The Israeli Raid on Beirut and the May Crisis The Aftermath 5. Reckoning Postponed: From the October War to the Civil War The October War and the Start of Negotiations Lebanese Domestic Politics after the October War Diplomacy on the Rocks 6. Disturbing Potential: The United States and the Renewed Conflict The Outbreak of Conflict The Military Cabinet and Syrian Mediation Sinai II and the Resumption of Violence in Lebanon The January Cease-Fire 7. Reluctant Interveners: The Red Line Agreement and Brown's Mediation The Constitutional Document and Shifting Alignments The Non-Negotiation of the Red Line The Brown Mission and the PLO From Election to Intervention 8. Taking Its Course: The Syrian Intervention and Its Limits Reacting to the Syrian Intervention Assassinations and Evacuations The New US-Syrian Dialogue The Second Syrian Military Offensive and the End of the Conflict Red Line Redux? Epilogue: The Cycle Continues

About the Author :
James R. Stocker is Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Trinity Washington University.

Review :
This valuable work provides a highly detailed review of the American diplomatic record and lays important groundwork for future scholars to expand upon, especially those who will put Stocker's revelations into greater conversation with Middle Eastern sources. Additionally, Stocker's assessment that perceptions about American action, even when not exercised, influenced decision making provides a useful framework for scholars of U.S. international relations. - Laila Ballout, Northwestern University (The Journal of American History) Stocker weaves in leading policy-makers' discussions and decisions with regional and international dynamics to shed light on how the United States viewed events in Lebanon in general, and the Lebanese government in particular.... Clearly uncovers what has been argued all along by Lebanese academics and policymakers, namely, that Lebanon has never been left alone to make its own decisions freely. (PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS)