The Problem of Evil in Plotinus

Excerpts from an article from The Philosophical Review, Volume 23: Dr. Fuller has published an interesting and exceedingly well written book in which he attempts to measure the value of mysticism from the point of view of its treatment of the problem of evil. He is interested to prove that a mystical view of the universe must either resolve Reality into a oneness without plurality, a goodness without evil, or must confess its own bankruptcy as a metaphysic. The author finds Plotinus a particularly inviting subject for dissection because the characteristic of his mysticism was its unwillingness to give up both plurality and evil, at the same time that it insisted upon the utter oneness and goodness of the Real. Dr. Fuller believes this to be due to the fact that Plotinus succeeded to two traditions, the naturalistic and the mystical. The naturalistic tradition was responsible for his joy in natural goods, and for that highly peculiar aspect of his philosophy which followed from it, -the belief in a plurality of goods, each perfect in its way and yet not so perfect as the One. The mystical tradition, on the contrary, was responsible for that aspect of his philosophy which voiced the scorn and contempt for the things of the natural world-the body, the human passions, etc.-and which recognized nothing truly worthwhile save the infinite and ineffable One. Plotinus's effort, through emanationism, to resolve the conflict between these two elements in his view, Dr. Fuller finds to be wholly futile, the fundamental fallacy residing in the attempt to make difference in kinds of perfection interchangeable with differences in degree of perfection. There is, Dr. Fuller shows, scarcely a contradiction in the whole Plotinian theodicy which is not referable to this confusion of kinds and degrees; for example, cannot be at once a perfection of its sort, and also less perfect than Ta tv. If, however, it is not less perfect, Plotinus's doctrine is a pluralism of perfects and not a mysticism. If, on the other hand, it is in fact less perfect, the world in so far has defect, and is therefore a dualism of good and evil, not a mystic monism. To hold that all comes from God, as light comes from the sun, helps in nowise to resolve the fundamental conflict here indicated. Dr. Fuller through his three hundred pages tosses Plotinus in painful alternation upon the horns of this dilemma. And yet it is a question whether Plotinus the mystic would have been much perturbed by his critic's merciless treatment. In the first place he would doubtless have questioned, with some sad resignation perhaps, whether his conscientious critic really understood his view as a mystic would understand it; or whether, standing on the outside of the view, he was not applying to it standards and methods of criticism which might indeed have application in his own outside region of thought, but which could have no pertinence within mysticism.... ...The value of Dr. Fuller's book, in short, lies not so much in its criticism of Plotinus (although one must acknowledge the value of much of the translation and exposition of Plotinian philosophy) as in its sharply critical handling of the problem of evil from our modern, non-mystical, self-assertive standpoint. No absolute optimism, he shows, no beneficent 'creationism'-and traditional Christianity falls here with all the rest-can any longer successfully resolve evil into good. That way is now closed. The alternative way, Dr. Fuller thinks, is through a frank and searching naturalism. In the discussion of the better way there is in the book much that is of interest and moment for students of religious philosophy, although it is a question whether they will find in Dr. Fuller's arguments a solution adequate to the perplexing problem of evil.