Moral Principles: (Bloomsbury Ethics)

The history of moral philosophy has been dominated by attempts to find and defend the correct moral principle or set of principles. However, over the last two decades the assumption that morality can and should be understood in terms of principles has come under attack from several quarters. The most radical attack has come from so-called moral particularists according to whom principles are at best useless and at worst a hindrance to successful moral reasoning and action. Why should – and how can – morality be based on principles? These are the leading questions of this book. Moral Principles offers a historically informed, in-depth examination of the current particularist/generalist debate and presents a novel account of the place of principles in our moral thought and action.

Table of Contents:
Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Moral Particularism 1.1 From scepticism about moral principles to particularism 1.2 The current particularism/generalism debate 1.3 The particularist challenge 2. Three Recent Attempts to Defend Moral Principles 2.1 Dancy's generalist critics 2.2 Moral principles and practical reasoning 3. The Nature and Roles of Moral Principles 3.1 Indeterminacy 3.2 Defeasibility 3.3 Moral principles and the activity of moral judgement 3.4 Moral principles and the capacity of moral judgement Conclusion Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Maike Albertzart is Lecturer at the Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany.

Review :
This highly readable and engaging book deals, in a sophisticated and accessible manner, with a major point of contention in contemporary moral philosophy. Defending the import of moral principles, Maike Albertzart carefully comes to grips with the challenges posed by moral particularists. Students and advanced philosophers alike can profit from reflection on this book's arguments. Matthew Kramer, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, UK Moral Principles displays an uncommon but very welcome ability to bring a grounded moral understanding to bear on abstract questions in ethical theory. Albertzart provides much-needed structure and clarity to the increasingly unwieldy literature about the particularist challenge to the significance of moral principles. She articulates a promising conception of moral principles, one which sustains the pride of place of moral principles in ethical thought while at the same time capturing much of the appeal of particularism. This conception of principles is fruitful on its own as a contribution to meta-ethics, and it also has great potential to inform and illuminate work in normative ethics. Jon Garthoff, Assistant Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, USA.