Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe

Conventional wisdom explains German defeat during World War II as almost inevitable, primarily for reasons of Allied economic or military brute force created when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 and entered into a two-front war. Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe challenges this conventional wisdom, highlighting how the re-establishment of the traditional German art of war—updated to accommodate new weapons systems—paved the way for Germany to forge a considerable military edge over its much larger rivals by playing to its qualitative strengths as a continental power. Ironically, these methodologies also created and exacerbated internal contradictions that undermined the very war machine they enabled and left it vulnerable to enemies with the capacity to adapt and build on potent military traditions of their own. The book begins by examining the methods by which the German economy and military prepared for war and the military establishment's formidable strengths—plus weaknesses. Steven D. Mercatante then offers an entirely new perspective on the Second World War in Europe. He demonstrates how Germany, through its invasion of the Soviet Union, came within a hairsbreadth of cementing a European-based empire that would have allowed the Third Reich to challenge the Anglo-American alliance for global hegemony. This outcome, according to commonly cited measures of military potential, should have been completely out of Germany's reach. The author concludes by tracing the final years of the war and assessing how Germany was able to hang on far longer than expected against the world's most powerful nations working in concert to engineer its defeat.

Table of Contents:
Part I Chapter 1: The German War Machine on the Eve of War: Myth versus Reality Chapter 2: The Third Reich Ascendant: The Reasons Why Part II Chapter 3: Comparing the World’s First Military Superpowers on the Eve of War Chapter 4: History’s Bloodiest Conflict Begins Chapter 5: An Inconvenient Decision Confronts Germany’s Masters of War Chapter 6: Another Roll of the Dice Chapter 7: Stalingrad in Context Chapter 8: The European War’s Periphery Chapter 9: Seizing the Initiative: The Sword versus the Shield Part III Chapter 10: A New Perspective for Explaining D-Day’s Outcome Chapter 11: Hitler’s Greatest Defeat Chapter 12: How the Third Reich Staved Off Total Defeat during the Summer of 1944 Chapter 13: End Game Selected Bibliography

About the Author :
Steven D. Mercatante is the founder and editor-in-chief of the Globe at War, a website that has established the author as a respected authority on World War II. Mercatante received his JD from Michigan State University College of Law, graduating with a concentration in international law.

Review :
Steven Mercatante makes a new and compelling case regarding how Nazi Germany lost the war. Written with verve, this book is a page-turner for anyone interested in how the Second World War unfolded. A thought-provoking book . . . [that] counter[s] widespread arguments that brute force was the main reason for success in World War II. . . . [Mercatante's] case deserves to be heard. Recommended all levels/libraries . . . challenges conventional wisdom about Allied success in Europe...an impressive operational overview. . . . Mercatante sees Operation Barbarossa as a turning point, nearly leading to Hitler's hegemony in Europe. Worth reading . . . much sound analysis . . . Mercatante . . . knows that the devil is in the details. To his credit, even those familiar with World War II scholarship will find here analyses of economic and technological matters that historians have often glossed over or mentioned only in passing.