About the Book
Since its establishment after World War II, the State of Israel has sought alliances with non-Arab and non-Muslim countries and minorities in the Middle East, as well as Arab states geographically distant from the Arab-Israel conflict. The text presents and explains this regional orientation and its continuing implications for war and peace. It examines Israel's strategy of outflanking, both geographically and politically, the hostile Sunni Arab Middle East core that surrounded it in the early decades of its sovereign history, a strategy that became a pillar of the Israeli foreign and defense policy. This “periphery doctrine” was a grand strategy, meant to attain the major political-security goal of countering Arab hostility through relations with alternative regional powers and potential allies. It was quietly abandoned when the Sadat initiative and the emerging coexistence between Israel and Jordan reflected a readiness on the part of the Sunni Arab core to deal with Israel politically rather than militarily. For a brief interval following the 1991 Madrid conference and the 1993 Oslo accords, Israel seemed to be accepted by all its neighbors, prompting then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to muse that it could even consider joining the Arab League. Yet this periphery strategy had been internalized to some extent in Israel’s strategic thinking and it began to reappear after 2010, following a new era of Arab revolution. The rise of political Islam in Egypt, Turkey, Gaza, southern Lebanon and possibly Syria, coupled with the Islamic regime in Iran, has generated concern in Israel that it is again being surrounded by a ring of hostile states—in this case, Islamists rather than Arab nationalists.
The book analyzes Israel’s strategic thinking about the Middle East region, evaluating its success or failure in maintaining both Israel's security and the viability of Israeli-American strategic cooperation. It looks at the importance of the periphery strategy for Israeli, moderate Arab, and American, and European efforts to advance the Arab-Israel peace process, and its potential role as the Arab Spring brings about greater Islamization of the Arab Middle East. Already, Israeli strategic planners are talking of "spheres of containment" and "crescents" wherein countries like Cyprus, Greece, Azerbaijan, and Ethiopia constitute a kind of new periphery.
By looking at Israel’s search for Middle East allies then and now, the book explores a key component of Israel’s strategic behavior. Written in an accessible manner for all students, it provides a better understanding of Israel’s role in the Middle East region and its Middle East identity.
Table of Contents:
For Whom it May Concern
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction
The Periphery Doctrine at WorkEvolution of a Grand StrategyThe Northern Triangle: Iran and TurkeyMorocco The Southern PeripheryThe Levant MinoritiesThe Kurds of Northern IraqThe Jewish DimensionThe American DimensionEnd of the First Periphery, 1973-1983
RamificationsIran: periphery nostalgia and its costsIsraeli skepticsBetween peripheries: peace, isolation and IslamIs there a new periphery?Arab reaction
ConclusionCan Israel find a regional identity?
Heads of Mossad
Persons interviewed
Maps:
The original periphery conceptThe expanded southern peripheryThe ethnic peripheryA new periphery?Index
About the Author
About the Author :
Yossi Alpher was an officer in Israeli military intelligence, followed by twelve years of service in the Mossad. Until 1995, he was director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. In July 2000, he served as Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Israel during the Camp David talks. From 2001 to 2012 he was coeditor of the bitterlemons.net family of internet publications.
Review :
For those weary of the rhetoric of politicians or the propagandizing of think tanks, Alpher’s sparkling book, based on information and experience acquired over 30 years, including interviews with several heads of Mossad, is a torrent of fresh air. As a former intelligence operative, he well knows that all rulers – Israeli or Iranians – combine pragmatism with core beliefs and ideology.
Dramatic changes have taken place in Israel’s security environment. What were the dynamics of the periphery doctrine in the years between 1956 and 1983? How should the doctrine be evaluated? Can a revised periphery doctrine deal with the new ring of hostility surrounding Israel in a more effective way? Readers will find answers with evolving interpretations in Periphery by Yossi Alpher, one of the most sophisticated professionals on Israeli strategy. . . .In addition to being a thought-provoking book on strategic history, Periphery lays the foundation for future research on a largely overlooked theme, and makes complex historical issues related to Israel’s strategies accessible to both conscientious readers and scholars.
Yossi . . . wrote a very interesting book.
Yossi Alpher’s book Periphery is an extraordinary attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Israeli strategy aimed at forging alliances with non-Arab states and minorities in the greater Middle East, as well as with remote Arab states, in order to break the isolation inflicted on Israel due to the Arab–Israeli conflict. . . .The fact that Alpher questions whether one can talk of a new periphery doctrine enhances his book’s relevance. . . .The policy recommendations in the book, even those that are more closely related to the 'original periphery,' are still very much relevant.
This book is enlightening and well researched, and will serve to educate both lay readers and specialist alike in a subject that moved from the de rigueur to the largely moribund. Moreover, the author’s extraordinary insights into Israeli statecraft as a result of his intelligence background make for a work that I have no hesitation in recommending to all those whose interest in Israel goes beyond the prosaic.
Years ago Israel undertook to weave an amazing combination of links, alliances, and common interests with a host of state and non-state actors from Morocco in the west to the Persian Gulf in the east and from deep in Africa in the south to Turkey and beyond. Yossi Alpher, an enthusiastic actor in this clandestine strategy, chronicles dramatic successes and heartbreaking failures with consummate skill. The exciting adventures, the blend of conspiracy ending in triumph or tragedy overshadows the entire book. Much of it has never even been published—it all comes from the prime sources. In the midst of the current storm in the Middle East, can Israel repeat this saga?—should it?
This book is a must for anyone wishing to understand who are the real players in this game, where it might lead, and what its consequences for mankind.
A fascinating and brilliant exposition of a crucial clandestine Israeli grand strategy and the key role played by the Mossad in its implementation in Iran, Yemen, and elsewhere. The author's extensive research and his own experience combine to provide unique and cogent insights. This is both a great history and a thoughtful guide for future policy makers in Israel and America.
This authoritative work fills in valuable background about Israel's long effort to find partners in its neighborhood. It not only shows how carefully coordinated Israel's efforts have been, but also provides an insightful framework for understanding Israeli foreign policy today.
Yossi Alpher unveils a secret history of behind-the-scenes alliances that eloquently testifies to Israel's struggle to make a place for itself in the world. No one could tell this story more authoritatively or candidly. Periphery is a revelation.
Yossi Alpher is unfolding in this book a fascinating affair in Israel's foreign and security policy: the successful efforts to create unexpected alliances between Israel and Moslem and non Moslem countries in the Middle East, in order to compensate for the belligerent relations with its immediate neighbors.
Alpher is sharing with his readers both: his personal story as a former Mossad man, who was involved in some of the activities in very surprising places, and his academic aim to put this very unique policy of David Ben Gurion in a helpful theoretical context, in order to understand better the foreign policy of Israel in a hostile neighborhood.
Besides the theoretical aspect, this book is another important contribution to the Israeli discourse; Alpher's creative ideas to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have penetrated the Israeli political arena, and influenced those decision makers who searched for solutions in the last 25 years.
As per the Israeli-Palestinian context. Here too, Alpher is presenting a pragmatic approach which stems from his deep love to Israel (to which he came as a new immigrant many years ago), and his disappointment from its political mistakes and from distancing itself from the more rational policies of its previous years.
The ‘scoops’ of this book (like the request of the Shah of Iran that Israel kill Ayatollah Khomeini, to which Israel refused of course) add a special flavor to the book and make it even more attractive to the potential reader.
