Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama

Can a nation accept limits in an arms competition? James H. Lebovic explores the logic of seeking peace in an arms race. Flawed Logics offers a compelling intellectual history of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control. Lebovic thoroughly reviews the critical role of ideas and assumptions in U.S. arms control debates, tying them to controversies over U.S. nuclear strategy from the birth of the atomic age to the present. Each nuclear arms treaty—from the Truman to the Obama administration—is assessed in depth and the positions of proponents and opponents are systematically presented, discussed, and critiqued. Lebovic concludes that the terms of these treaties with the Russians were never as good as U.S. proponents claimed nor as bad as opponents feared. The comprehensive analysis in Flawed Logics is objective and balanced, challenging the logic of hawks and doves, Democrats and Republicans, and theorists of all schools with equal vigor. Lebovic’s controversial argument will promote debate as to the very plausibility of arms control.

Table of Contents:
Preface Introduction: Arms Control and the Power of Belief 1. Initial U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Initiatives: The Truman through Eisenhower Years 2. Early Success at Arms Control: The Kennedy Administration and the Limited Test Ban Treaty 3. The Era of Bilateral Nuclear Arms Limitations: The Johnson through Carter Years 4. Nuclear Arms Reductions in the Final Cold WarDecade: The Reagan Years 5. Nuclear Arms Reductions after the Cold War: The George H. W. Bush through Obama Years 182 6. The United States and Strategic Nuclear Arms Control: Assessing Intentions, Constraining Capabilities Notes References Index

About the Author :
James H. Lebovic is a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University. He is author of The Limits of U.S. Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq, also published by Johns Hopkins.

Review :
This book is well written and, as such, a pleasure to read. —T.V. Paul, H-Net Reviews Flawed Logics is an impressive piece of scholarship. Lebovic displays an encyclopedic knowledge of past debates about arms control in the United States. —Jeffrey W. Knopf, Monterey Institute of International Studies, H-Net Reviews Lebovic's depictio of logical inconsistency is accurate and will be of interest to advanced students. —Choice Flawed Logics offers an excellent overview of arms control from the Baruch Plan to New START. The volume generates interesting scholarly insights. —Ralph Dietl, Sehepunkte Highly recommended to students of all levels of expertise, as well as politicians and members of academia. —Natalia Sharova, Review of Politics Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama by James H. Lebovic [opens] the reader's eyes to the complex and chaotic process of American policymaking during the Cold War . . . highly recommended to students of all levels of expertise, as well as politicians and members of academia. —Natalia Sharova, Review of Politics James Lebovic's Flawed Logics is a thoughtful, penetrating, and disturbing book, well worth the interested reader's attention. It offers a thorough review and analysis of how American officials and advisers shaped U.S. arms control policies on nuclear weapons in negotiations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, with brief consideration given as well to U.S. arms control policymaking since George H.W. Bush's presidency. —Patrick M. Morgan, Peace Review For anyone interested in a sophisticated history of US arms control efforts, James Lebovic's Flawed Logics provides a fine starting point . . . Lebovic avoids the quantitative methods, airtight logical typologies, and parsimonious theorizing that dominate much of contemporary international relations scholarship. Instead, he sticks to a qualitative reading of the policy debates over nuclear arms agreements and nuclear strategies within each presidential administration since Harry S. Truman's. —Christian Scholar's Review [Lebovic's] book provides a new perspective through which students can have a thorough picture of the history of nuclear arms control negotiations. The book is also of interest to experts and policy makers who would like to deepen their knowledge about the role of beliefs and ideas in the field. —Political Studies Review