Uncivil War: The British Army and the Troubles, 1966–1975(Cambridge Military Histories)

When Operation Banner was launched in 1969 civil war threatened to break out in Northern Ireland and spread over the Irish Sea. Uncivil War reveals the full story of how the British army acted to save Great Britain from disaster during the most violent phase of the Troubles but, in so doing, condemned the people of Northern Ireland to protracted, grinding conflict. Huw Bennett shows how the army's ambivalent response to loyalist violence undermined the prospects for peace and heightened Catholic distrust in the state. British strategy consistently underestimated community defence as a reason for people joining or supporting the IRA whilst senior commanders allowed the army to turn in on itself, hardening soldiers to the suffering of ordinary people. By 1975 military strategists considered the conflict unresolvable: the army could not convince Catholics or Protestants that it was there to protect them and settled instead for an unending war.

Table of Contents:
Introduction; 1. Baggage; 2. The army's short-lived Ulster honeymoon; 3. Escalation and the erosion of impartiality; 4. Edward Heath's bid for victory; 5. The road to Bloody Sunday; 6. The most deadly year; 7. Strategy in the shadow of loyalist power; 8. We cannot envisage peace; Conclusion; A note on sources.

About the Author :
Huw Bennett teaches International Relations at Cardiff University. He is the author of Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency (2012).

Review :
'A vivid, compelling book on a dramatic and important subject. A major contribution.' Richard English, author of Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA 'This deeply researched and lucid book provides new and sometimes challenging perspectives on a vital topic: it deserves to be widely read.' Helen Parr, author of Our Boys: The Story of a Paratrooper 'Huw Bennett's determined pursuit of key political and military records – in the teeth of substantial official obstruction – has enabled him to write the most authoritative account so far of British military action in the early 1970s, the period when the shape of the Northern conflict was largely fixed.' Charles Townshend, author of The Partition: Ireland Divided 1885–1925 '…shatters many of the myths around the early years of the Troubles.' Sam McBride, Belfast Telegraph '(a) compelling read.' History Ireland '…by far the most comprehensive account of the army's role in this period… it needs to be read by all interested in putting legacy issues within their complex historical context.' Henry Patterson, Belfast News Letter 'Uncivil War is a bold and dense interpretation of a difficult and multilayered subject…scholarship at its most thorough (and most rewarding).' Peggy Kurkowski, Washington Independent Review of Books 'Books of this calibre do not come along very often... Uncivil War is a major contribution to our understanding of the early Troubles: it will surely grace reading lists for years to come as the 'go-to' study of the British Army in the formative years of its longest operation.' Tim Wilson, Intelligence and National Security 'A very readable account of the first three decades of conflict which dominated the everyday life of most of the combat arms of the army.' Patrick Mercer, The Critic '… a convincing and compelling account of the breakdown of trust between the British Army and Northern Ireland's Catholics, and the political and military factors which contributed to it. It is essential reading for scholars and students of the 'Troubles', and the reviewer would also personally recommend it to serving British soldiers and marines, particularly those who think that 'lessons learned' should involve studying the painful periods of recent military history as well as the more creditable ones.' Geraint Hughes, Small Wars & Insurgencies '[A] fascinating, provocative, humane and objective study which rewrites the history of the British Army in Northern Ireland in these pivotal years and more broadly suggests the way that military history can and should be written.' Tony Craig, English Historical Review