From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy(Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

The expansion of suffrage and the introduction of elections are momentous political changes that represent only the first steps in the process of democratization. In the absence of institutions that protect the electoral autonomy of voters against a range of actors who seek to influence voting decisions, political rights can be just hollow promises. This book examines the adoption of electoral reforms that protected the autonomy of voters during elections and sought to minimize undue electoral influences over decisions made at the ballot box. Empirically, it focuses on the adoption of reforms protecting electoral secrecy in Imperial Germany during the period between 1870 and 1912. Empirically, the book provides a micro-historical analysis of the democratization of electoral practices, by showing how changes in district level economic and political conditions contributed to the formation of an encompassing political coalition supporting the adoption of electoral reforms.

Table of Contents:
1. Introduction; 2. The protection of voters' autonomy; 3. Electoral intimidation by state employees; 4. Electoral intimidation by private actors; 5. The production of irregularities at times of elections: a quantitative analysis; 6. The adoption of electoral reforms; 7. Labor scarcity, rural inequality, and electoral reforms: the determinants for electoral reform of the Prussian electoral system; 8. Voting for opposition candidates: economic concentration, skills, and political support for social democracy; 9. Dilemmas on the right and the road to proportional representation; 10. From macro- to micro-historical analysis in comparative research.

About the Author :
Isabela Mares is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. She has conducted research on comparative democratization and electoral reform, comparative political economy, and comparative social policy. She is the author of The Politics of Social Risk (Cambridge University Press, 2003), which won the Gregory Luebbert Award of the American Political Science Association for best book in comparative politics, and of Taxation, Wage Bargaining and Unemployment (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Review :
'An admirable piece of work that combines an impressive knowledge of German nineteenth-century history with skillful archival research and an astonishing command of quantitative methods. I find the idea of voter intimidation and the costs of voter repression as leading terms in a local-level quantitative analysis of electoral practices and reforms in an emerging nation-state a major step forward in the analysis of institutional change. The way the book moves between qualitative narratives of historical local conditions and sophisticated quantitative analyses is exemplary and sets a standard for social science taking history seriously.' Wolfgang Streeck, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies