The Methodology of Aristotle's Inquiry Into the Human Good in the Nicomachean Ethics.

G. E. L. Owen's seminal work on Aristotelian methodology distinguished between an endoxic method of inquiry and a scientific method in Aristotle's works. The endoxic method involves gathering reputable beliefs (endoxa ), i.e., beliefs held by the majority of human beings or one or more wise individuals, about the subject of investigation; raising puzzles about the reputable beliefs; and solving the puzzles in a way that clarifies the initial reputable beliefs. By contrast, the scientific method consists in establishing general facts (to hoti) about the phenomenon in question on the basis of perception, experience, or induction and then devising a theory that captures the essence of the phenomenon, thereby enabling one to explain (to dihoti) the initial facts. Owen thought that Aristotle used the former method (clarifying beliefs) for philosophical/conceptual inquiries, e.g., into the nature of place in the Physics, and the latter method (explaining facts) for empirical inquiries, e.g., into the different life activities of animals in the biological works. Owen's work inspired what is now the orthodox interpretation of Aristotle's ethical methodology. Since the central question of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) concerns the nature of human goodness---a question that we today would consider a meta-ethical question---it is natural within Owen's framework to suppose that Aristotle would investigate such a question using the endoxic method. This conclusion appears to be reinforced by the fact that Aristotle employs that method in his inquiry into weakness of will in NE VII 1-10. However, my dissertation challenges this longstanding orthodoxy. I argue that, in the NE, Aristotle employs a method in his inquiry into the human good that is in fact a version of the scientific method described above. My central claim is that Aristotle conducts that inquiry by gathering general facts about human goodness and developing an explanatory theory constrained by those facts. This interpretation has several important consequences. For instance, it enables us to resolve the infamous tension between the NE I and X accounts of the human good. Drawing on my interpretation, I argue that we should view the definition reached by the famous function argument of NE 1.7 as an intermediate step in a larger inquiry, one whose conclusion guides the subsequent investigation towards the ultimate explanatory definition of the human good in NE X, not as a self-contained attempt to clarify reputable opinions which competes with NE X's own attempt. Furthermore, my interpretation forces us to reconsider our view of the scope of the scientific or 'empirical' method. Not only is such a method applicable to theoretical subject matters, e.g., natural philosophy; suitably modified, it can also yield systematic conclusions about what Aristotle would deem practical questions. The difference between the subject matters of practical and theoretical disciplines, then, does not translate into a difference in their methods. I begin my study of the NE's inquiry into the human good by examining the two methods distinguished by Owen, with a view to clarifying their respective data. I argue that reputable beliefs and facts are different kinds of data on the grounds that they differ with respect to the epistemic weight that each carries at the beginning of inquiry. This conclusion paves the way for the rejection of the orthodox interpretation. A textual analysis of the inquiry into the human good reveals that Aristotle uses facts about human goodness as the data for that inquiry, with the aim of developing an explanatory theory that respects them. Reputable beliefs do play a role in the...