A timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the field
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind provides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline’s most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities.
Written to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, the second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid.
- Presents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in philosophy of mind
- Offers head-to-head debates on central topics such as consciousness, intentionality, normativity, mental causation, materialism, and perception
- Provides a dynamic view of contemporary thinking about fundamental and controversial issues
- Includes a thorough introduction providing a comprehensive background to the issues explored in each debate
Part of Wiley-Blackwell’s acclaimed Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, professional philosophers, and sophisticated general readers with an interest in the subject.
Table of Contents:
Notes on Contributors ix
Introduction to the Second Edition Jonathan Cohen xiii
Introduction to the First Edition Jonathan Cohen xviii
Part I Mental Content 1
Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3
1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 5
2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 19
Is Externalism About Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 33
3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 35
4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael McKinsey 50
Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 63
5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 65
6 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 80
Is There Non-conceptual Content? 97
7 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 99
8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard Kimberly Heck 110
Part II Physicalism 131
Is Non-reductive Materialism Viable? 133
9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-reductive Materialism Louise Antony 135
10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 152
Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 173
11 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 175
12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. McLaughlin 189
Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 213
13 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 215
14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 230
Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 251
Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 253
15 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 255
16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 272
Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 285
17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 287
18 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 303
Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 317
19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 319
20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 341
Part IV Perception And Mental Capacities 359
Should Perception Be Understood in Terms of Representation, Direct Contact with the World, or a Hybrid View? 361
21 Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science Craig French and Ian Phillips 363
22 Naïve Realism v. Representationalism: An Argument from Science Adam Pautz 384
23 Capacities-First Philosophy Susanna Schellenberg 406
Is Perception General, Particular, or a Hybrid? 431
24 Perceiving Particulars Christopher S. Hill 433
25 Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content: The Best of Both Theories Heather Logue 449
How Should We Understand the Distinction Between Perception and Cognition? 467
26 The Perception–Cognition Border: Architecture or Format? E. J. Green 469
27 Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File Ned Block 494
Is Pain a Natural Kind? 517
28 Scientific Eliminativism for Pain Jennifer Corns 519
29 Pain Is a Natural Kind Matthew Fulkerson 535
Do We Need Imagination Over and Above Imagery and Supposition? 551
30 Against Imagination Bence Nanay 553
31 Why We Need Imagination Amy Kind 570
Index 588
About the Author :
BRIAN P. MCLAUGHLIN is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University. He has published numerous papers in fields including philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. He co-authored (with Vann McGee) Terrestrial Logic: Formal Semantics Brought Down to Earth (forthcoming, Oxford).
JONATHAN COHEN is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. He is the author of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.
