Philosophy of Action: An Anthology(Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies)

Table of Contents:
Preface x Source Acknowledgments xi 1 Philosophical Investigations §§611–628 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein Part I Action and Agency 3 Introduction to Part I 5 2 Agency 10 Donald Davidson 3 Shooting, Killing and Dying 21 Jonathan Bennett 4 The Problem of Action 26 Harry G. Frankfurt 5 Agents and their Actions 33 Maria Alvarez and John Hyman 6 Agency and Actions 48 Jennifer Hornsby Part II Willing and Trying 63 Introduction to Part II 65 7 Acting, Willing, Desiring 69 H. A. Prichard 8 The Will 76 Gilbert Ryle 9 Acting and Trying to Act 83 Jennifer Hornsby 10 Action and Volition 91 E. J. Lowe Part III Intention and Intentional Action 101 Introduction to Part III 103 11 Intention §§1–9 107 G. E. M. Anscombe 12 Knowing What I Am Doing 113 Keith S. Donnellan 13 Intending 119 Donald Davidson 14 Two Faces of Intention 130 Michael Bratman 15 Acting As One Intends 145 John McDowell 16 Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language 158 Joshua Knobe 17 The Toxin Puzzle 161 Gregory S. Kavka 18 The Ontology of Social Agency 164 Frederick Stoutland Part IV Acting for a Reason 177 Introduction to Part IV 179 19 Actions, Reasons, and Causes 183 Donald Davidson 20 How to Act for a Good Reason 193 Jonathan Dancy 21 Acting for a Reason 206 Christine Korsgaard 22 Arational Actions 222 Rosalind Hursthouse 23 Agency, Reason, and the Good 230 Joseph Raz 24 Skepticism About Weakness of Will 245 Gary Watson Part V The Explanation of Action 257 Introduction to Part V 259 25 Explanation in Science and in History §§1–3 263 Carl G. Hempel 26 The Rationale of Actions 270 William Dray 27 Explanation in Science and in History §§4–7 280 Carl G. Hempel 28 The Explanatory Role of Being Rational 289 Michael Smith 29 The Conceivability of Mechanism 303 Norman Malcolm 30 Action, Causality, and Teleological Explanation 315 Arthur W. Collins 31 Psychological vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior 333 Fred Dretske Part VI Free Agency and Responsibility 341 Introduction to Part VI 343 32 Human Freedom and the Self 347 Roderick Chisholm 33 Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility 353 Harry G. Frankfurt 34 Responsibility, Control, and Omissions 360 John Martin Fischer 35 The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility? 373 Galen Strawson 36 Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency 382 Helen Steward 37 Free Will and Science 393 Alfred R. Mele

About the Author :
Jonathan Dancy is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin and at the University of Reading, UK. An internationally known specialist in ethics, epistemology, and early modern philosophy, Professor Dancy is author of five books: An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell, 1985), Berkeley: an Introduction (Blackwell, 1987), Moral Reasons (Blackwell, 1993), Practical Reality (2000), and Ethics Without Principles (2004). Constantine Sandis is Professor in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University. He is the author of The Things We Do and Why We Do Them (2012) and the editor or co-editor of New Essays on Action Explanation (2009), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), Hegel on Action (2010), and Human Nature (2012).