Common Pool Resources: Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information

Common Pool Resources include, for instance, fishing grounds, irrigation systems, forests and the atmosphere. Now more than ever, how we responsibly share and use those goods is a vital issue. This textbook introduces students of economics, business and policy studies to the key issues in the field. It uses a game-theory approach to help readers understand the mathematical representation of how to find equilibrium behavior in CPRs, how to identify the socially optimal appropriation, and how to measure the inefficiencies that arise. Algebra and calculus steps are clearly explained, so students can more easily reproduce the analysis and apply it in their own research. Finally, the book also summarizes experimental studies that tested theoretical results in controlled environments, introducing readers to a literature that has expanded over the last decades, and provides references for further reading.

Table of Contents:
Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Common pool resources in a static setting; 3. Common pool resources in a dynamic setting; 4. Entry deterrence in the commons; 5. Repeated interaction in the commons; 6. Commons under incomplete information; 7. Signaling in the commons; Appendix A: game theory tools; Appendix B: solutions of selected end-of-chapter exercises.

About the Author :
Ana Espinola-Arredondo is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University. Felix Muñoz-Garcia is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

Review :
'If you are looking for a textbook on common-pool resource problems that is both rigorous and intuitive, then you can't go wrong with this book. In a clear and engaging writing style, it provides comprehensive coverage of the individual and combined roles of strategic interactions, information and dynamics on the outcomes for all the involved parties. Professors and students will appreciate the analysis and exercises.' George Zaccour, HEC Montreal, Canada 'Common-pool-resources experience the tragedy of the commons. The wonderful framework presented in this book addresses strategic behavior, inefficiencies, and incomplete information, all of which challenge optimal CPR management. This introductory-level textbook features simple and simplified game theory models and an emphasis on the institutions behind the various modeling assumptions. Presented in a clear manner, this textbook is accessible to both senior undergraduates as well as to graduate students and scholars.' Ariel Dinar, University of California, Riverside 'This book provides an excellent explanation of common pool resources use by building a simple model and expanding on that model to incorporate many of the complexities associated with natural resources including repeated interactions, incomplete information, and uncertainty. The material presented introduces more complex economic modeling but at a level that is still useful for advanced undergraduates.' Adrienne Ohler, University of Missouri 'This textbook offers a great introduction to Common Pool Resources. It is a helpful tool that provides not only a step by step guide on how to solve CPR problems but also the economic interpretation of the results to help understand the intuition behind the outcomes.' Eleni Stathopoulou, Nottingham Trent University