The Intelligence War against the IRA

The exposure of two senior republicans as informers for British intelligence in 2005 led to a popular perception that the IRA had 'lost' the intelligence war and was pressurised into peace. In this first in-depth study across the entire conflict, Thomas Leahy re-evaluates the successes and failures of Britain's intelligence activities against the IRA, from the use of agents and informers to special-forces, surveillance and electronic intelligence. Using new interview material alongside memoirs and Irish and UK archival materials, he suggests that the IRA was not forced into peace by British intelligence. His work sheds new light on key questions in intelligence and security studies. How does British intelligence operate against paramilitaries? Is it effective? When should governments 'talk to terrorists'? And does regional variation explain the outcome of intelligence conflicts? This is a major contribution to the history of the conflict and of why peace emerged in Northern Ireland.

Table of Contents:
Introduction; Part I. The Intelligence War, August 1969 to July 1972: 1. British political, military and intelligence strategy towards the IRA, August 1969 to July 1972; 2. The Intelligence War part I, August 1969 to July 1972; 3. The IRA's ceasefire, 26 June to 9 July 1972; Part II. On the Verge of Defeat?: the Intelligence War Part II, July 1972 to December 1975: 4. British political, military and intelligence strategy towards the IRA, July 1972 to December 1975; 5. The Intelligence War part II: July 1972 to December 1975; 6. 'Everything is compromisable after the British Declaration of Intent': the IRA returns to ceasefire, December 1974 and December 1975; Part III. The Struggle to Contain the IRA, January 1976 to April 1998: 7. British political, military and intelligence strategy towards the IRA, 1976 to 1998; 8. The Intelligence War part III: Belfast and Derry city, January 1976 to August 1994; 9. The Intelligence War part III: the IRA in rural areas, England and the IRA leadership, January 1976 to August 1994; 10. 'It's the primacy of politics that's important': alternative reasons for the IRA's ceasefires in August 1994 and July 1997; Conclusion; Appendix 1. IRA 'intended target' killings by year in various geographical areas where the IRA operated, 1969 to 1994; Appendix 2. Seats won by Sinn Féin and the SDLP in district council elections between 1985 and 1997; Appendix 3. Other alleged agents and informers killed by the IRA.

About the Author :
Thomas Leahy is a Lecturer in British and Irish politics and contemporary history in the Politics and International Relations department at Cardiff University.

Review :
'An important and difficult subject, explored with skill and in very impressive, well-researched detail.' Richard English, author of Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA 'Informers and agents are central to insurgencies. They can be devastatingly effective, yet inflict terrible suffering. Meticulously dissecting the intelligence war in different regions, Leahy's analysis of how informers and agents affected the strategic interaction between republicanism and the British state is a major contribution to scholarship on the Northern Ireland conflict.' Huw Bennett, author of Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency 'Thomas Leahy's study of the Intelligence War in Northern Ireland draws on rich new evidence from the archives to provide a well-paced, thought-provoking and richly-textured account of the impact of British Intelligence measures during the conflict. The author makes a compelling case for analysing both military and political intelligence together and offers a fresh new perspective on why it took so long to bring an end to the violence through a negotiated peace settlement.' Niall Ó Dochartaigh, author of From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles '… sheds new light on how British intelligence used agents, informers, special-forces and surveillance in the city during the recent conflict.' Kevin Mullan, Derry Journal '… this is a well-informed, competent, accessible and engaging assessment of the role of intelligence in the periods before the IRA ceasefires. It will be useful for scholars not just of the 'Troubles' but of the role that terrorist groups and their leadership, state political actors, the security forces and intelligence can play in progress towards peace.' Samantha Newbery, Intelligence and National Security '… an easy read … this work should be recognised as a valuable contribution to our understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict and a timely disruption of a potentially dangerous consensus.' Patrick Mulroe, History Ireland 'Thomas Leahy's The Intelligence War Against the IRA is an important new contribution to the growing, and changing, interpretations of The Troubles … a great addition to The Troubles canon. It is a well-researched study with a diverse range of secondary material, a wealth of archival evidence and interviews with significant figures on all sides of the conflict.' Nick Clifton, History@Kingston 'This well-researched and argued study will interest students of Northern Ireland, political violence, and counterinsurgency.' A. H. Plunkett, Choice