Forms of Fellow Feeling: Empathy, Sympathy, Concern and Moral Agency

What is the basis of our capacity to act morally? This is a question that has been discussed for millennia, with philosophical debate typically distinguishing two sources of morality: reason and sentiment. This collection aims to shed light on whether the human capacity to feel for others really is central for morality and, if so, in what way. To tackle these questions, the authors discuss how fellow feeling is to be understood: its structure, content and empirical conditions. Also discussed are the exact roles that relevant psychological features - specifically: empathy, sympathy and concern - may play within morality. The collection is unique in bringing together the key participants in the various discussions of the relation of fellow feeling to moral norms, moral concepts and moral agency. By integrating conceptually sophisticated and empirically informed perspectives, Forms of Fellow Feeling will appeal to readers from philosophy, psychology, sociology and cultural studies.

Table of Contents:
Part I: 1. Introduction: empathy, sympathy, concern and moral agency Neil Roughley and Thomas Schramme; Part II. Empathy, Sympathy and Concern: 2. Empathy, altruism, and helping: conceptual distinctions, empirical relations Dan Batson; 3. Self-recognition, empathy and concern for others in toddlers Doris Bischof-Köhler and Norbert Bischof; Part III. Understanding Empathy: 4. Self-simulation and empathy Heidi Maibom; 5. Empathy as an instinct Michael Slote; 6. A moral account of empathy and fellow feeling Lawrence Blum; Part IV. Fellow Feeling and the Development of Pro Sociality: 7. Empathy-related responding and its relations to positive development Nancy Eisenberg; 8. An interdisciplinary perspective on the origins of concern for others: contributions from psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and sociobiology Carolyn Zahn-Waxler, Andrew Schoen and Jean Decety; 9. Sophisticated concern in early childhood Amrisha Vaish; Part V. Empathy and Morality: 10. Is empathy required for making moral judgements? John Deigh; 11. The empathy in moral obligation. An exercise in creature construction Neil Roughley; 12. Empathy and reciprocating attitudes Stephen Darwall; 13. The role of empathy in an agential account of morality: lessons from autism and psychopathy Thomas Schramme.

About the Author :
Neil Roughley is Chair for Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics at the University of Duisburg–Essen. His systematic areas of specialisation lie in ethics, action theory, philosophical psychology and the theory of human nature. His historical interests concern the classical figures of ethical sentimentalism, particularly Adam Smith and David Hume, as well as the history of action theory. He is the author of Wanting and Intending. Elements of a Philosophy of Practical Mind (2015) and co-editor of the German-language volume Wollen. Seine Bedeutung, seine Grenzen (2015). Roughley also co-edited On Moral Sentimentalism (2015) with Thomas Schramme. Thomas Schramme is Chair in Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. His background is in philosophy, but he has often worked in interdisciplinary projects. He has published widely in the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry, mainly on the concepts of health and disease. He also specialises in moral psychology and political philosophy. Most recently he has published the Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine (co-edited with Steven Edwards, 2017). He has edited several collections of essays, for instance Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity (2014). Schramme also co-edited On Moral Sentimentalism (2015) with Neil Roughley.

Review :
'The essays in this impressive collection challenge some of the received wisdom about empathy in philosophy and psychology. Their cumulative effect is to introduce much needed nuance into the occasionally heated discussion about the importance of fellow feeling for morality and prosocial behaviour.' Antti Kauppinen, University of Helsinki 'This rich volume addresses central questions in concerns with morality: what are the roles of emotions in moral norms, moral judgments, and prosocial behaviors? Forms of Fellow Feeling brings together the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, all disciplines necessary to understandings of relations between emotions and morality. The volume is unique in its focused discussions of the complex conceptual and empirical questions around empathy, sympathy and morality.' Elliot Turiel, University of California, Berkeley 'The topic of empathy has recently been a 'hot' one. This book expands our understanding of it in welcome ways. A distinguished international panel of philosophers and psychologists, including experts in legal thought and social psychology, contribute to build a rich picture of the current state of our understanding. They explore both the variety of different forms of 'fellow-feeling' - from the purely cognitive to the instinctively emotional - and debate their complex role in moral and political life.' Ronald de Sousa, University of Toronto 'Here is one of the most comprehensive reviews of what we know about human empathy and sympathy offered by the greatest experts in the field. Although empathy is a quintessentially mammalian capacity, we humans have taken it further than any other species. This is why Forms of Fellow Feeling also pays attention to the cognition involved and the moral implications. Empathy is at the core of being human, and we have made astonishing advances in our understanding.' Frans de Waal, author of The Age of Empathy 'This anthology of academic essays on the topic of empathy and morality, from a multi-disciplinary perspective, will be a valuable addition to the field.' Simon Baron-Cohen, University of Cambridge