From Conflict to Coalition: Profit-Sharing Institutions and the Political Economy of Trade(Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

International trade often inspires intense conflict between workers and their employers. In this book, Adam Dean studies the conditions under which labor and capital collaborate in support of the same trade policies. Dean argues that capital-labor agreement on trade policy depends on the presence of 'profit-sharing institutions'. He tests this theory through case studies from the United States, Britain, and Argentina in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; they offer a revisionist history placing class conflict at the center of the political economy of trade. Analysis of data from more than one hundred countries from 1986 to 2002 demonstrates that the field's conventional wisdom systematically exaggerates the benefits that workers receive from trade policy reforms. From Conflict to Coalition boldly explains why labor is neither an automatic beneficiary nor an automatic ally of capital when it comes to trade policy and distributional conflict.

Table of Contents:
1. Introduction; 2. A theory of profit-sharing institutions; 3. Evidence and research design; 4. The gilded wage; 5. Liberalized by labor; 6. Trade politics in Britain and Argentina; 7. Power over profits; 8. Conclusion.

About the Author :
Adam Dean is an Assistant Professor of International Political Economy at George Washington University, Washington DC. He specializes in international relations with a focus on international political economy. His research interests include the political economy of trade, labor politics, and American political development. He earned his B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania, his M.Sc. from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

Review :
'From Conflict to Coalition is an important and original book in which Adam Dean decisively advances scholarly understanding of the political economy of globalization. Drawing on meticulous research for a series of elegantly constructed case studies, Dean examines the conditions under which organized labour comes to share or dissent from the international trade policy preferences of employers. The result is a major scholarly publication, which will be of interest to researchers in economic history, American political development, and international political economy.' Desmond King, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of American Government, University of Oxford 'Adam Dean's book is an exciting addition to the literature on the political economy of trade. The book contains innovative theoretical insights concerning profit-sharing institutions and their role in shaping trade policy preferences of workers. By using a careful multi-method approach, Dean is able to trace the origins of these labor institutions as well as their influence on trade policy across a wide variety of countries. This book should be read by any scholar interested in the political economy of trade policy.' Jon Pevehouse, Vilas Distinguished Achievement Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison 'Adam Dean's fascinating book makes a strong case that analysts of international trade policy have failed to take into account whether an industry has profit-sharing institutions. Dean's claim is that profit-sharing institutions are critical in generating solidarity between industry and labor - either for protection or liberal trade.' Robert O. Keohane, Professor of International Affairs, Princeton University 'In an era when globalization is under assault from the Left and Right across the developed world, Adam Dean presents a provocative new argument about the politics of trade protection. Exploiting firm-level heterogeneity in what he calls profit-sharing institutions, Dean persuasively shows that workers support protection only when they share in the rents created by trade barriers. This is a tremendous book of history with great contemporary relevance.' David A. Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences, University of California, San Diego