Foundations of Comparative Politics

Table of Contents:
Part I: What is Comparative Politics? Chapter 1: Introduction Political Ideology Overview of the Book Chapter 2: What is Science? What Is Science? The Scientific Method An Introduction to Logic Myths About Science Conclusion Chapter 3: What is Politics? The Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (EVL) Theory of Politics What Happens in the EVL Theory? Insights From the EVL Theory Conclusion Part II: The Modern State: Democracy or Dictatorship? Chapter 4: The Origins of the Modern State What Is the State? The Social Contract View of the State The Predatory View of the State Conclusion Chapter 5: The Economic Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship Early Democracy vs Modern Democracy A Brief Overview of Modernization Theory Income and Democracy Modernization Theory and Democracy: A Closer Look The Conditionality of Modernization Theory Inequality and Democracy Conclusion Chapter 6: The Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship Does Democracy Require a Civic Culture? Are Some Religions Incompatible With Democracy? Theorizing About Culture Conclusion Chapter 7: Democratic Transitions Bottom-Up Transitions to Democracy Top-Down Transitions to Democracy Conclusion Part III: Varieties of Democracy and Dictatorship Chapter 8: Varieties of Dictatorship A Common Typology of Authoritarian Regimes The Two Fundamental Problems of Authoritarian Rule Selectorate Theory Conclusion Chapter 9: Problems with Group Decision Making Problems With Group Decision Making Arrow’s Theorem Conclusion Chapter 10: Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies Classifying Democracies Governments in Parliamentary Democracies Governments in Presidential Democracies Governments in Semi-Presidential Democracies Conclusion Chapter 11: Elections and Electoral Systems Elections and Electoral Integrity Electoral Systems Legislative Electoral System Choice Conclusion Chapter 12: Social Cleavages and Party Systems Party Systems Where Do Parties Come From? Types of Political Parties and Social Cleavages Number of Parties: Duverger’s Theory Party Competition Conclusion Chapter 13: Institutional Veto Players Federalism Bicameralism Constitutionalism Veto Players Conclusion Part IV: Varieties of Democracy and Political Outcomes Chapter 14: Consequences of Democratic Institutions Majoritarian or Consensus Democracy? The Effect of Political Institutions on Fiscal Policy Electoral Laws, Federalism, and Ethnic Conflict Presidentialism and Democratic Survival Conclusion

About the Author :
William Roberts Clark is head of the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University and a fellow at the Institute for the Study of Religion at Baylor University. He is the author of Capitalism, Not Globalism, and his articles have appeared in American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, Political Analysis, and European Union Politics, among other journals. He has been teaching at a wide variety of public and private schools (William Paterson College, Rutgers University, Georgia Tech, Princeton, New York University, and the University of Michigan) for more than three decades. Matt Golder was previously assistant professor of political science at Florida State University. He is the author of articles which have appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, and Political Analysis among other journals. He has taught classes on comparative politics, advanced industrialized democracies, quantitative methods, and European politics at the University of Iowa, Florida State University, and the University of Essex. Sona Nadenichek Golder was previously assistant professor of political science at Florida State University. She is the author of The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation, and has published articles in the British Journal of Political Science, Electoral Studies, and European Union Politics. She teaches courses on European politics, democracies and dictatorships, comparative institutions, game theory, and comparative politics at Florida State University and was a Mentor-in-Residence for the 2007 Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models Summer Program at UCLA .