Western views of southern Somalia are dominated by perceived gaps in the overall liberal order. Classical Western liberalism emphasizes individualism, civil and political liberties, the rule of law, and state structures.
Counter-insurgency warfare in former European colonial possessions since the 1960s has been a continuing challenge. Neither in Vietnam, nor in Afghanistan, nor in Iraq did Western armies “win” counter-insurgency wars in a way that left them stable, moderate, peaceful, states. They were left wartorn or under great oppression. Local elites did not share Western aims and did not unify to work together. Liberalism’s aims of peace and progress were not achieved.
Every time a large liberal expeditionary force has been dispatched to stabilize a developing state since 1990, the results have been mixed or poor, even after deployments sometimes measured in decades (for example, the United Nations in the Congo since 1999).
A detailed examination of the civilian government, international and indigenous military forces, and the police in southern Somalia shows that they are not capable of defeating the Al-Shabaab insurgents.
Both the “Sunni Awakening” in Iraq in 2006 and the local clan offensives against Al-Shabaab from 2022 in Somalia offered the hope that a locally empowered approach, however, might make counter-insurgency success more attainable.
However, from the situation in southern Somalia, it appears extremely unlikely that liberal counter-insurgency aims can be achieved through a locally empowered approach. Local elites do not share wider Western aims and are intensely divided.
More generally, large, transformative, liberal-democratic expeditions into the developing world appear to have virtually no chance of success. First and foremost this is because local elites share neither their values nor aims. These elites are also, generally, bitterly divided and willing to fight for victory over each other’s factions into the indefinite future.
The toll of climate destruction is growing, meaning Western resources will be increasingly needed closer to home. Between the very poor prospects of success, and the growing calls on limited deployable expeditionary resources, large, transformative Western liberal expeditions should end.
Table of Contents:
Preface and Acknowledgements
Introduction
Chapter I: Surveying the Literature
Chapter II: The Local and Hybrid Turns in Peacebuilding
Chapter III: The Failure of Counterinsurgency in Somalia
Chapter IV: Other Non-COIN Options
Chapter V: Conclusions
Appendix 1: Initial Somali Brigades, 2008-2015
Appendix 2: Somali Battalions and Locations, 2022
Appendix 3: “New” Somali Post-offensive Brigades, May 2024
Appendix 4: Internationally Recognised Presidents of Somalia, 2004-2025
About the Author :
Dr Colin D. Robinson lectures on War Studies at Cranfield University, Shrivenham.
His research centres on the strategic challenges and opportunities for OECD states’ defence aims and programmes in the remainder of the world, as well as the history of African armies, the African Standby Force, military command and control, and New Zealand defence issues.
He has recently been focused on how liberal ideology, liberal ideas, at the highest levels, both help and impede OECD progress in building partner armies, notably in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and for Liberia, where he did his doctoral fieldwork.
He sits on the editorial boards of Defence and Security Analysis and the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies. He spent much of 2020-22 teaching on military decisions and strategy for the eSchool of Professional Military Education, USAF Air University. He previously worked for the United Nations in Georgia, Liberia, and New York.
Colin Robinson completed his doctorate in 2012, worked for the University of Liberia 2016-17, and was a Visiting Lecturer at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University in 2018.
