Judicial Independence in Transitional Democracies

This book presents interdisciplinary and comparative analyses of judicial independence in transitional democracies across Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Although judicial empowerment and independence in transitional democracies have gained both academic and real-world prominence in recent decades, an ongoing debate persists regarding the nature, scope, and determinants of judicial independence in transitional settings. Some transitional democracies successfully develop democracy and the rule of law with the sustained growth of judicial independence, whereas others grapple with substantial challenges and move more towards authoritarianism. This book examines factors that drive de jure and de facto judicial independence in transitional democracies and evaluates their relationship. In doing so, it identifies challenges and opportunities associated with developing judicial independence in transitional democracies. At the intersection of political science and law, the work will be a valuable resource for academics, researchers, and policymakers in constitutional law, constitutional politics, and human rights law.

Table of Contents:
Introduction; Part I. De Facto Judicial Independence; 1. Judicial Independence in Hybrid Regimes: A Comparison between Bangladesh and Pakistan; 2. Party System Institutionalization, Political Competition and Judicial Independence in Transitional Democracies: Evidence from South Korea and the Philippines; 3. Undermining Judicial Independence: Chief Justices and Political Alignment in Mexico's Judicial Politics; 4. The Weakening Judicial Independence through the Transition from the Judicialization of Politics to the Politicisation of Judiciary: Turkish Case; 5. Independence and Autonomy – Means towards Ends: How Misconceived Independence Created an Isolated Judiciary in Slovakia; 6. Strengthening De Facto Judicial Independence in Cambodia: Articulating a Human Rights-based Approach; Part II. Theoretical and Conceptual Discussion; 7. Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Developing Democracies; 8. The Role of the Separation of Powers in Preventing Arbitrariness; Part III. De Jure Judicial Independence; 9. The Judiciaries in Africa at Crossroads: Can they Counter the Wave of Authoritarian Resurgence?; 10. Judicial Independence in the Asia Pacific Region from the Perspective of Comparative Judicial Politics; 11. Judicial Independence in Iraq: Jurisdictional Conflicts between the Higher Judicial Council and the Federal Supreme Court; 12. Judicial Independence in Chile, 1973-2023; 13. Constitutional Design as an Enabler of Peace: Colombia and its Constitutional Reform of 1991; Conclusion: Challenges, Opportunities, and Recommendations for Judicial Independence in Transitional Democracies

About the Author :
Nauman Reayat is Lecturer in Law at the School of Law, University of Leicester, United Kingdom. Previously, he was a postdoctoral fellow of the Economic Social Research Council at the School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, United Kingdom. His research interests include comparative judicial politics, judicial independence, and the rule of law in authoritarian states and developing democracies. Rhona K.M. Smith is Professor of International Human Rights at Newcastle University, United Kingdom. From 2015-2021, she served the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council as UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia. Moohyung Cho is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Ewha Womans University, South Korea. His research interests include comparative judicial politics, specifically judicial independence and the rule of law in authoritarian regimes and developing democracies.