There Will Be the Devil to Pay: Central Bankers, Uncertainty and Sensemaking in the European Financial Crisis of 1931(Studies in Macroeconomic History)

The European financial crisis of 1931 was a pivotal moment in the economic and financial history of the twentieth century. Based on extensive archival research and a cultural conceptual framework, There Will be the Devil To Pay offers a new and much needed understanding of the European financial crisis. It tells the dramatic story of the five months that led to the breakdown of the gold standard, writing the history of the crisis from the perspective of central bankers, private bankers, and government officials. It provides a new narrative of how those involved struggled to understand and respond to the crisis as it unfolded. Contributing to the emerging literature on radical uncertainty and narrative economics, this book provides a detailed analysis of how decision-makers confront uncertainty and shape narratives that create actionable knowledge and enable decision-making.

Table of Contents:
1. Introduction; 2. Central bankers and their world; 3. Preparing for crisis (May 11 – May 19); 4. Foreign Creditors (May 16 – May 25); 5. Moratorium or guarantee? (May 25 – May 27); 6. Guarantee at last? (May 26 – June 1); 7. Releasing the BIS credit (May 29 – June 5); 8. Surrounded with trouble (June 5 – June 10); 9. Where and how to place? (June 8 – June 13); 10. A world political problem (June 11 – June 16); 11. Francis Rodd makes sense – and a plot (June 9 – June 20); 12. To act now if we are to act at all (June 16 – June 27); 13. Germany will collapse (June 19 – July 10); 14. Anxiety within Germany at climax (July 11 – July 23); 15. Going off the Gold Standard? (July 14 – August 21); 16. As for the future of England (August 21 – September 17); 17. Exit (September 16 – October 23); The End (2024).

Review :
'You may think that you know the 1931 financial crisis. But Per Hansen's colourful 'thick description' places the crisis in a new light. Hansen pushes back against dominant narratives, highlighting the climate of radical uncertainty in which central bankers were forced to act. By bringing the crisis alive, he helps us see it in a new way.' Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley 'The crisis of 1931 is a seminal moment in financial history that has attracted historians for decades. Hansen provides a fresh perspective by focusing on the individuals involved, and how they made sense of the crisis as it unfolded. The result is a very readable and forensic narrative, focused on central bankers from the US and Britain as well as the nascent Bank for International Settlements. A valuable addition to our understanding of central banking in crisis.' Catherine R. Schenk, University of Oxford 'Imagining how people in the past understood their world is a major challenge for the historian. Based on a novel methodology, inspired by social science as well as history, Per Hansen offers a stimulating new perspective on events we thought we knew well. Most of all, he shows how much we miss when we ignore the words of historical actors or read them only through our own interpretative frames.' Mary O'Sullivan, University of Geneva 'The year 1931 witnessed the worst financial crisis of the twentieth century. Per Hansen's vivid account describes how central bankers struggled to save the financial and monetary system under conditions of radical uncertainty, with a special focus on their prior beliefs, blind spots and adapting narratives. This 'thick description' is, so far, the most precise and realistic report of the annus horribilis.' Tobias Straumann, University of Zurich '… a forward-looking narrative of the financial crisis based on extensive research in the archives of the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and Bank for International Settlements. … Recommended.' J. L. Rosenbloom, CHOICE