Nuclear Weapons: The Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace

This is a clear, non-technical and comprehensive study of nuclear strategy and the balance of power. The book is intended for both supporters and opponents of nuclear deterrence-indeed for all who believe that nuclear issues cannot be wished away or laid aside but must be addressed with knowledge, even if this means thinking about the unthinkable. Within a coherent system of thought, this volume addresses the most fundamental issues of our time, such as the first-strike advantage, arms-control agreements, the Star Wars program, the "nuclear winter" hypothesis, and nuclear conflict itself. The book is packed with valuable factual information, including notes, diagrams, illustrations, and appendices.

Table of Contents:
List of Tables, Figures, and Appendix Figures List of Abbreviations Preface 1 The Balance of Terror 2 Basic Theory and the Evolution of Strategic Postures Introduction Basic Theory Comparison with Earlier Balances of Power Unilateral Terror The Balance of Terror Mutual Assured Destruction Flexible Response Subsequent Developments Soviet Postures 3 How It Came To Be Introduction Birth of Nuclear Age Political Tensions The Balance of Terror Conclusion 4 Is It Necessary? Inroduction Western Perceptions of the Soviet Threat Words Deeds Soviet Perceptions of the Western Threat Conclusion 5 Nuclear Weapons and World Politics Introduction Military Strength and Political Power Limitations on Political Power of Strong Countries Will-power of Weaker Countries Will-power of Strong Countries Perceptions and Signals Conventional Capabilities World-wide Other Nuclear Countries Relative Military Strengths Attitudes to Use of Military Force Taunting Goliath Global Political Effects Bipolarity The Status quo and Spheres of Influence Conventions of International Behaviour The Incentive to Bargain and Detente Conclusion 6 Intrinsic Stability Intrinsic and Dynamic Stability Preliminary Exposition Risk-aversion and Unacceptable Damage Perceived Will to Retaliate Intelligence Communications 7 Military Capabilities First and Second Strikes, Counter-force and Counter-city Second-strike Capability to Inflict Unacceptable Damage Alternative Formulations First-striker's Advantage and the Incentive to Strike First Counter-force Exchange Rates The Development of Counter-force Capabilities Ways of Reducing First-striker's Advantage Launch on Assessment Counter-city Second-strike Capabilities and the 'Strike and Bargain' Scenario First-striker's Advantage and Deterrence against Conventional Attack Vulnerability of Cities Conclusions 8 War-fighting and Minimum Deterrence Deterrence and War-fighting Capability Other Needs for a War-fighting Capability Some Elements in a War-fighting Capability Civil Defence and War-fighting Capability Minimum Deterrence and 'Sufficiency' 9 Arms Control Shared Interests Agreements Objectives Problems SALT and MBFR START, INF and the Geneva Negotiations Mutual and Stable Minimum Deterrence (MSMD) 10 Dynamic Stability Introduction Full-scale Attack Scenario Tension and Provocation Scenarios Proliferation, Accident and Madness Scenarios Misunderstanding Escalation and the Boundaries of Crisis Factors Affecting Escalation Crisis Management 11 Extended Deterrence and First Nuclear Use Introduction Extended Deterrence First Nuclear Use Credibility Role of Theatre Nuclear Weapons Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence against Conventional Attack Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence against Theatre Nuclear Attack Stopping a War Once Begun Fighting the War and Keeping it Limited Flexibility Circumstances of First Nuclear Use Intermediate-range Theatre Nuclear Forces Objections to Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Modernisation The 'Zero Option' United States or NATO Deployments 12 Limiting Nuclear War Could Nuclear Conflict be Limited? Firebreak Visibility Firebreaks by Announcement Firebreaks and Flexibility of Weapon Systems Firebreaks and Political Will General Conclusions Implications for NATO Strategy 13 Policies Towards the Blance of Terror: (1)Rejection and Abdication Introduction Need for a Balance of Terror Advantages of a Balance of Terror Disadvantages of a Balance of Terror Alternative Policies General and Complete Disarmament by Agreement Unilateral Complete Disarmament Nuclear Disarmament by Agreement Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament The Moral Dimension Forswearing Aggression in Any Form Forswearing First Nuclear Use European Options A European Nuclear-free Zone Unilateral Withdrawal of Nuclear Forces from West European Soil Independent Nuclear Deterrents Conclusion 14 Policies Towards the Balance of Terror: (2) Acceptance and Improvement Introduction Reasons for Guarded Optimism Main Threats to Stability Hardening of Soviet Policies Political Problems in the West Political Turbulence World-wide First-striker's Advantage Hazards of Crisis Combinations of Unstable Factors Postscript on Nuclear Proliferation Postscript on Defences against Nuclear Weapons Some Policy Implications Strategic Postures Political Signals and Detente Military Capabilities Adequacy of Existing Capabilities Appendix: The Algebra of Mutual Deterrence and Stability A Simple Model Functional Forms Risk-aversion and the Will to Retaliate Ability to Inflict Unacceptable Damage War-fighting Capability First-Striker's Advantage Balance of Risk between Striking and Not Striking Deterrence against Conventional Attack Notes and References Index

About the Author :
Economist A.J.C. Edwards is a graduate of Oxford University and Harvard University. Formerly affiliated with the British Royal College of Defence, he currently serves as Assistant Secretary in Her Majesty's Treasury.