Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy(Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

In Zion's Dilemmas, a former deputy national security advisor to the State of Israel details the history and, in many cases, the chronic inadequacies in the making of Israeli national security policy. Charles D. Freilich identifies profound, ongoing problems that he ascribes to a series of factors: a hostile and highly volatile regional environment, Israel's proportional representation electoral system, and structural peculiarities of the Israeli government and bureaucracy. Freilich uses his insider understanding and substantial archival and interview research to describe how Israel has made strategic decisions and to present a first of its kind model of national security decision-making in Israel. He analyzes the major events of the last thirty years, from Camp David I to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, through Camp David II, the Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2005, and the second Lebanon war of 2006. In these and other cases he identifies opportunities forgone, failures that resulted from a flawed decision-making process, and the entanglement of Israeli leaders in an inconsistent, highly politicized, and sometimes improvisational planning process. The cabinet is dysfunctional and Israel does not have an effective statutory forum for its decision-making—most of which is thus conducted in informal settings. In many cases policy objectives and options are poorly formulated. For all these problems, however, the Israeli decision-making process does have some strengths, among them the ability to make rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision-making, effective planning within the defense establishment, and the skills and motivation of those involved. Freilich concludes with cogent and timely recommendations for reform.

Table of Contents:
IntroductionPart I. The Setting1. Constraints and Players: The External Environment, Proportional Representation System, and National Security Establishment Israel's National Security Environment The Proportional Representation System The National Security Establishment2. The Decision-Making Process: How the System Actually Works Pathology 1: An Unplanned Process Pathology 2: A Highly Politicized Process Pathology 3: Semi-organized Anarchy; or, Is Anyone at the Helm? Pathology 4: An Uninstitutionalized Process Pathology 5: Primacy of the Defense Establishment Something Must Be Good: Strengths of the Israeli SystemPart II. The Case Studies3. Camp David I: Making Peace with Egypt, 1977–19794. The Makings of a Young Lion: The Lavi Combat Aircraft, 1980–19875. The Invasion of Lebanon, 19826. Leaving Lebanon: The Unilateral Withdrawal, 20007. Camp David II: The Israeli- Palestinian Negotiations, 1999–20008. Disengaging from Gaza, 20059. Back Again: The Second Lebanon War, 2006Part III. Final ThoughtsConclusions and Recommendations The Case Studies in Comparative Perspective Key Findings Past Attempts at Reform Failings Tolerable No Longer Future ReformsAppendix 1: The INSC Law, 2008 Appendix 2: Recommendations of the Winograd Commission and the Shahak CommitteeList of Interviews Notes Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Charles D. ("Chuck") Freilich is a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School and teaches political science at Harvard, Tel Aviv University, and elsewhere. Prior to serving as deputy national security advisor, he was a senior analyst in the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Freilich is the author of numerous op-eds, appears regularly in American, Israeli, and international media, and speaks widely on Middle Eastern issues.

Review :
Zion's Dilemmas is the most detailed analysis to date of the inner workings of Israel's national security establishment. It presents seven case studies: the two Lebanon wars (1982 and 2006); the peace processes with Egypt and the Palestinians; the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon, in 2000, and Gaza, in 2005; and the failed Lavi fighter jet project, an ambitious attempt to build an indigenous warplane with U.S. funding, which was canceled in 1987. - Aluf Benn (Foreign Affairs) Freilich's book, which furnishes a unique glimpse into the Israeli national security decision-making process, is sure to become the 'go to' work on the subject. It is a must read for anyone interested in how and why Israeli governments have made—and continue to make—the national security decisions that they do. - David Rodman (Israel Affairs) How often is a reviewer assigned a book he or she can confidently predict will become not only an indispensable reference work but the essential reference point for future research on a given subject? Zion's Dilemmas is one such instance, and its author is to be congratulated for his outstanding scholarly contribution to the field of contemporary Israel studies writ large, and more specifically to the analysis of the country's internal policymaking processes and status as a highly controversial yet formidable Middle Eastern and global state actor. (Israeli Journal of Foreign Affairs) The author... presents a very informative account of how Israel formulates its national security policy.... The book also presents an in-depth analysis of the DMP in several major case studies in Israel's national security history. - Efraim Inbar (Political Science Quarterly) This volume is by one of the foremost analysts of Israel's national security policy (NSP).... It analyzes seven case studies dealing with NSP toward the Palestinians, Gaza, and Lebanon, and the building of the Lavi jet fighter.... Freilich argues that it is imperative for Israel to correct its NSP failures in order to meet expected strong challenges in the future. Those interested in Israel's NSP and its foreign policies will benefit greatly from this study.... Summing Up: Highly recommended. (Choice)