Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge(SUNY series in Philosophy)

Guided by the founding ideas of American pragmatism, Epistemology provides a clear example of the basic concepts involved in knowledge acquisition and explains the principles at work in the development of rational inquiry. It examines how these principles analyze the course of scientific progress and how the development of scientific inquiry inevitably encounters certain natural disasters. At the center of the book's deliberations there lies not only the potential for scientific progress but also the limit of science as well. This comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge addresses a myriad of topics, including the critique of skepticism, the nature of rationality, the possibility of science for extraterrestrial intelligences, and the prospect of insoluble issues in science.

Table of Contents:
Preface Introduction KNOWLEDGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 1. Modes of Knowledge Is Knowledge True Justified Belief? Modes of (Propositional) Knowledge Other Basic Principles 2. Fallibilism and Truth Estimation Problems of Metaknowledge The Preface Paradox The Diallelus An Apory and Its Reconciliation: K-Destabilization Costs and Benefits More on Fallibilism The Comparative Fragility of Science: Scientific Claims as Mere Estimates Fallibilism and the Distinction Between Our (Putative) Truth and the Real Truth 3. Skepticism and Its Deficits The Skeptic's "No Certainty" Argument The Role of Certainty The Certainty of Logic Versus the Certainty of Life Pragmatic Inconsistency Skepticism and Risk Rationality and Cognitive Risk The Economic Dimension: Costs and Benefits The Deficiency of Skepticism 4. Epistemic Justification in a Functionalistic and Naturalistic Perspective Experience and Fact Problems of Common-Cause Epistemology Modes of Justification The Evolutionary Aspect of Sensory Epistemology Rational versus Natural Selection Against "Pure" Intellectualism The Problem of Error Conclusion 5. Plausibility and Presumption The Need for Presumptions The Role of Presumption Plausibility and Presumption Presumption and Probability Presumption and Skepticism How Presumption Works: What Justifies Presumptions 6. Trust and Cooperation in Pragmatic Perspective The Cost Effectiveness of Sharing and Cooperating in Information Acquisition and Management The Advantages of Cooperation Building Up Trust: An Economic Approach Trust and Presumption A Community of Inquirers RATIONAL INQUIRY AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 7. Foundationalism and Coherentism Hierarchical Systemization: The Euclidean Model of Knowledge Cyclic Systemization: The Network Model--An Alternative to the Euclidean Model The Contrast Between Foundationalism and Coherentism Problems of Foundationalism 8. The Pursuit of Truth: Coherentist Criteriology The Coherentist Approach to Inquiry The Central Role of Data for a Coherentist Truth-Criteriology On Validating the Coherence Approach Ideal Coherence Truth as an Idealization 9. Cognitive Relativism and Contextualism Cognitive Realism What's Wrong with Relativism The Circumstantial Contextualism of Reason A Foothold of One's Own: The Primacy of Our Own Position The Arbitrament of Experience Against Relativism Contextualistic Pluralism is Compatible with Commitment on Pursuing "The Truth" The Achilles' Heel of Relativism 10. The Pragmatic Rationale of Cognitive Objectivity Objectivity and the Circumstantial University of Reason The Basis of Objectivity The Problem of Validating Objectivity What is Right with Objectivism Abandoning Objectivity is Pragmatically Self-Defeating 11. Rationality Stage-Setting for the Problem Optimum-Instability Ideal versus Practical Rationality: The Predicament of Reason The Problem of Validating Rationality The Pragmatic Turn: Even Cognitive Rationality has a Pragmatic Rationale Alternative Modes of Rationality? The Self-Reliance of Rationality is Not Viciously Circular COGNITIVE PROGRESS 12. Scientific Progress The Exploration Model of Scientific Inquiry The Demand for Enhancement Technological Escalation: An Arms Race Against Nature Theorizing as Inductive Projection Later Need Not Be Lesser Cognitive Copernicanism The Problem of Progress 13. The Law of Logarithmic Returns and the Complexification of Natural Science The Principle of Least Effort and the Methodological Status of Simplicity-Preference in Science Complexification The Expansion of Science The Law of Logarithmic Returns The Rationale and Implications of the Law of Logarithmic Returns The Growth of Knowledge The Deceleration of Scientific Progress Predictive Implications of the Information/Knowledge Relationship The Centrality of Quality and its Implications 14. The Imperfectability of Knowledge: Knowledge as Boundless Conditions of Perfected Science Theoretical Adequacy: Issues of Erotetic Completeness Pragmatic Completeness Predictive Completeness Temporal Finality "Perfected Science" As an Idealization that Affords a Useful Contrast Conception The Dispensability of Perfection COGNITIVE LIMITS AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 15. The Rational Intelligibility of Nature Explaining the Possibility of Natural Science "Our" Side Nature's Side Synthesis Implications 16. Human Science as Characteristically Human The Potential Diversity of "Science" The One World, One Science Argument A Quantitative Perspective Comparability and Judgments of Relative Advancement or Backwardness Basic Principles 17. On Ignorance, Insolubilia, and the Limits of Knowledge Concrete versus Generic Knowledge and Ignorance Erotetic Incapacity Divine versus Mundane Knowledge Issues of Temporalized Knowledge Kant's Principle of Question Exfoliation Cognitive Incapacity Insolubilia Then and Now Cognitive Incapacity Identifying Insolubilia Relating Knowledge to Ignorance Postscript: A Cognitively Indeterminate Universe 18. Cognitive Realism Existence Is Man the Measure? Realism and Incapacity The Cognitive Opacity of Real Things The Cognitive Inexhaustibility of Things The Corrigibility of Conceptions The Cognitive Inexhaustibility of Things Cognitive Dynamics Conceptual Basis of Realism as a Postulate Hidden Depths: The Impetus to Realism The Pragmatic Foundation of Realism as a Basis for Communication and Discourse The Idealistic Aspect of Metaphysical Realism Science and Reality Notes Index

About the Author :
Nicholas Rescher is University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh and the author of many books, including Realistic Pragmatism: An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy; Predicting the Future: An Introduction to the Theory of Forecasting; Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy; and Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge; all published by SUNY Press. Among his many achievements, he is former president of the American Philosophical Association and recipient of the Alexander von Humboldt Prize for Humanistic Scholarship.

Review :
"This book covers a wide span of issues in epistemology and encapsulates complex debates with lucidity. It lives up to its goal of organizing research in contemporary theory of knowledge into a 'single systematic whole.'"