Of Two Minds: The Nature of Inquiry(SUNY series in Philosophy)

Proposes a resolution to the paradox of inquiry, originally formulated in Plato's Meno and most recently the focus of the "logic of discovery" debate in the philosophy of science.

Table of Contents:
Acknowledgments Introduction: The Mind's Own Method PART I: INQUIRY WRIT LARGE Scientific Discovery 1. Full Circle: The Return to Discovery Method without Novelty Novelty without Method 2. The Logic of Correction Correction vs. Elimination Correction by Means of Elimination? Composite Responses and Partial Successes The Black Box Principle Toward a Logic of Discovery 3. Generating Explanations from Facts Initial Hypothesis Predicted Observations Contrasted Actual Observations Proposed Hypothesis Determination of Explanatory Power 4. Generating Facts from Explanations Initial Observations Proposed Hypothesis Contrasted Explanatory Hypothesis Predicted Observations Determination of Factuality 5. Novelty and Method: Remarried The First Principle of Inquiry Ampliative Inference The Regulative Principle of Correction 6. Maps of Discovery The Second Principle of Inquiry First-Order Maps Generation and Confirmation in Maps Second-Order Maps Second-Order Justification The Relativity of Result and the Scope of Inquiry Quantitative Variation and Intelligent Inquiry 7. Reciprocal Justification: Stability without Foundations The Third Priciple of Inquiry Some Earlier Views Reflective Equalibrium Neither Foundations nor Coherence Reciprocal Justification with Epistemic Privilege The Revisability of Observation Reports Reciprocal Justification at Different Cognitive Levels The Generality of Correction Theory 8. Discovery and the Philosophy of Science I: Enemies of Correction Partial Success and Evolution Evolutionary Epistemology I: Karl Popper Evolutionary Epistemology II: Donald Campbell 9. Discovery and the Philosophy of Science II: Friends of Correction Abductive Inference: C.S. Peirce and N. R. Hanson Computer Modeling of Discovery: Herbert Simon Generative Justification: Thomas Nickles PART II: REPRESENTATION Analog Maps and Digital Rules 10. Analog Maps Mental Imagery and Analog "Representation" Resemblance Continuity Density Seriality The Digital and the Sequential Relational Identity The Analog beyond Mental Imagery Conclusion 11. Digital Rules Analog Maps: Representing as Reproducing Digital Rules: Representing as Encoding Representational Incompleteness Levels of Representation Qualitative and Quantitative Rules Half-Levels of Representation Abstract Models Conclusions 12. The Calculus of Perception Representation and Translation Perception without Background Knowledge Representation Mistaken for Transduction Representation and Perceptual Inference Conlusion 13. Unarticulated Meaning Meaning, Articulation, and Formulation Prior Acquaintance At What Level of Cognition Does Meaning Exist Meanings of Abstract Concepts PART III: INQUIRY AND THE MIND The Articulation of Meaning 14. Saying What We Mean Initial Expression Proposed Meaning Contrasted Actual Meaning Proposed Expression Determination of Articulateness 15. Meaning What We Say Initial Meaning Proposed Expression Contrasted Articulate Expression Proposed Meaning Determination of Actuality Second-Order Maps Metaphor and Inquiry 16. Inquiry and Philosophy I: Plato's Paradox Platonic Inquiry "Knowing" and "Not Knowing" in the Theaetetus "Knowing That" and "Knowing Why" "Knowing" and "Not Knowing" in the Meno Levels of "Knowing That" and "Knowing Why" The Structure if Inquiry in the Platonic Dialogues 17. Inquiry and Philosophy II: Kant and the Perfection of Cognition The Informativeness of Propositions Kantian Analysis and the "Improvement" of Form The Paradox of Analysis The Fruits of Analysis: Genera Genera as Rules Analysis and Synthesis of Mathematical Concepts Analysis and Reason in the Perfection of Cognition Conclusion 18. Inquiry and Philosophy III: Hegel's Dialectical Logic Dialectic and Definition Dialectic and Ampliative Inference Dialectic as Correction The Category-Dependence of the Standard Contradiction Dialectic and Scientific Inference PART IV: OF TWO MINDS Inquiry and Human Consciousness 19. The Dialogue of the Soul with Itself Two Models of Inner Speech A Conservative between Cognitively Different Partners Talkings to Ourselves: Earlier Views Self-Consciousness Other "Dialogues" Hearing the Inner Voice Conclusion 20. The Roots of Duality Feeling and Representation Epistemology with Feeling The Duality Postscript: En Route to Knowledge Notes Bibliography Index

About the Author :
James Blachowicz is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago.

Review :
"Blachowicz tackles the most central questions of epistemology and cognitive psychology in a most ambitious way. Part I has significant implications for philosophy of science and theory of knowledge, Part II raises crucial issues about representation, one of the hottest topics of cognitive science and philosophy, and Part III continues with an original account of meaning, a topic central to psychology, linguistics, and computer science as well as philosophy. Blachowicz's central points are extremely important, and he traces out their implications for an unexpectedly wide range of problems in very insightful ways. The scope of his informed reading is remarkable compared to that of most American philosophers." - Thomas Nickles, University of Reno, Nevada "The most important and interesting contribution of this book is that it reopens the perennially vexing set of problems in the philosophy of science concerning the nature of creative thinking and the logic of scientific discovery. The book may well revive interest in the logic of discovery, and do that in a fruitful way by providing the larger context needed in general epistemology. In my judgment this is the best book written on this subject to date." - Richard Blackwell, Saint Louis University