Military Decision-Making Processes: Case Studies Involving the Preparation, Commitment, Application and Withdrawal of Force

President Bill Clinton, speaking as might any commander-in-chief, on the eve of his decision to deploy ground troops to Bosnia in 1995, declared he had "no responsibility more grave than putting soldiers in harm's way." Such a statement suggests that a study of the decision-making process associated with the weighty matters of using force would be enlightening. Indeed, it is. The decision-making process is far from standardized nor is it simple. While all individuals associated with important decisions about national security and the lives of America's service members take their responsibilities seriously, the processes by which they reach their conclusions are varied and complicated. The book traces eight traditional and emerging theories or models of decision-making by first explaining the components of each model and then by analyzing its practical application through three case studies. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of the utility and explanatory power of the particular model. Instructors considering this book for use in a course may request an examination copy here.

Table of Contents:
Table of Contents Preface Introduction Chapter 1: The Rational Actor Model Example 1: Truman’s Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb on Japan, 1945 Example 2: Reagan’s Decision to Bomb Libya, 1986 Example 3: Bush’s Decision to Halt Operation Desert Storm, 1991 Utility of the Rational Actor Model Chapter 2: Prospect Theory Example 1: Washington’s Decision to Attack Trenton, 1776 Example 2: Meade’s Decision Not to Pursue Lee After Gettysburg, 1863 Example 3: Clinton’s Decision to Withdraw from Somalia, 1993 Utility of the Prospect Theory Chapter 3: Poliheuristic Theory Example 1: Eisenhower’s Decision Not to Intervene in Hungary, 1956 Example 2: Kennedy’s Authorization of the Bay of Pigs, 1961 Example 3: Johnson’s Decision to De-escalate US Involvement in Vietnam, 1968 Utility of the Poliheuristic Theory Chapter 4: The Bureaucratic Model Example 1: The Confederate Departmental System’s Impact on the Vicksburg Campaign, 1862–1863 Example 2: The ­Army–Air Force Helicopter Rivalry, 1950s–1960s Example 3: The Department of State and the Department of Defense and the Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Beirut, 1982 Utility of the Bureaucratic Model Chapter 5: The Organizational Process Model Example 1: Strategic Formulation in the Vietnam War, 1960s–1970s Example 2: The Decision to Abort the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission, 1980 Example 3: The Federalization of the California Army National Guard During the Los Angeles Riot, 1992 Utility of the Organizational Process Model Chapter 6: The Small Group Model Example 1: The Blockade Board in the Civil War, 1861 Example 2: The Executive Committee During the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 Example 3: The Restricted Interagency Group in Developing a Strategy Toward Nicaragua, 1980s Utility of the Small Group Model Chapter 7: The Elite Theory Example 1: The Influence of the Congressional Black Caucus in the Decision to Intervene in Haiti, 1993 and 1994 Example 2: The Role of the Media in the Decision to Intervene in Somalia, 1992 Example 3: The Agenda of Secretary of State Madeline Albright in the Decision to Intervene in Kosovo, 1999 Utility of the Elite Theory Chapter 8: The Pluralist Model Example 1: Conscription in the Confederate Army, 1861–1864 Example 2: The Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers in the Midst of the ­Iran-Iraq War, 1987–1988 Example 3: The Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, 1995 Utility of the Pluralist Model Epilogue Chapter Notes Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Kevin Dougherty, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, is the assistant commandant for leadership programs and an adjunct professor at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina.