Experiments in Environmental Economics: v. 1 & 2(International Library of Environmental Economics & Policy)

Over the decades, experiential methods have become an established research tool in environmental economics. Economists working in this area have realized that experimental methods from economics and other disciplines such as psychology and decision theory can be applied to gain insight into the behavioral underpinnings of environmental policy. Economic experiments, in the lab and field, are an attractive tool to address the incentive and contextual questions that arise in environmental policy. Experiments have been and continue to be designed to capture the key elements of market and non-market choices to test theory, for pattern recognition, to testbed new institutions, and to value public goods, including environmental protection. This volume collects the most significant papers in the literature that identify the underpinnings of experimental approaches are complemented by works that specifically address the use of experimental economics to identify choice under risk, conflict, cooperation, environmental policy instruments and environmental valuation.

Table of Contents:
Volume I: Motives and methods - Microeconomic systems as an experimental science, Vernon L. Smith (1982); Will economics become an experimental science?, Charles R. Plott (1991); Economics and ecology - A comparison of experimental methodologies and philosophies, Jason F. Shogren and Clifford Nowell (1992); Let's keep the con out of experimental econ - A methodological note, Alvin E. Roth (1994); Progress in behavioral game theory, Colin F. Camerer (1997); Environmental risk: Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method, Gordon M. Becker, Morris H. DeGroot and Jacob Marschak (1964); Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon, David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott (1979); Prospect theory - An analysis of decision under risk, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979); The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981); Do biases in probability judgment matter in markets?, Colin F. Camerer (1987); Experimental Evidence: Risk, ambiguity, and insurance, Robin M. Hogarth and Howard Kunreuther (1989); The impact of self-protection and self-insurance on individual response to risk, Jason F. Shogren (1990); The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1991); Insurance for low-probability hazards - A bimodal response to unlikely events, Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze and Don L. Coursey (1993); Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using experimental data, John D. Hey and Chris Orme (1994); Environmental conflict: An empirical approach to the prisoners' dilemma game, Lester B. Lave (1962); Probabilistic destruction of common-pool resources: Experimental evidence, James M. Walker and Roy Gardner (1992); Communication in coordination games, Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross (1992); An experimental study of the centipede game, Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1992); Repeated play, cooperation and coordination: An experimental study, Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal (1994); The role of communication in resolving commons dilemmas - Experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators, Steven Hackett, Edella Schlager and James Walker (1994); Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation - An experimental evaluation, Charles F. Mason and Owen R. Phillips (1997); Endogenous timing in a gaming tournament, Kyung Hwan Baik, Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll and Jason F. Shogren (1999). Volume II: Environmental cooperation: The coase theorem - Some experimental tests, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer (1982); Experimental evaluation of the coase theorem, Glenn W. Harrison and Michael McKee (1985); Coasian solutions to the externality problem in experimental markets, Glenn W. Harrison, Elizabeth Hoffman, E.E. Rutstrom and Matthew L. Spitzer (1987).