Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA

The time for serious soul-searching regarding the role of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community in general is long overdue. The recent intelligence failures regarding the unanticipated collapse of the Soviet Union, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the run-up to the Iraq war demonstrate a CIA and a $50 billion intelligence enterprise that cannot provide strategic warning to policymakers and, even worse, is capable of falsifying intelligence to suit political purposes. It will not be possible to reform the enterprise until we understand and debate the nexus between intelligence and policy, the important role of intelligence, and the need for an intelligence agency that is not beholden to political interests. The recent appointment of three general officers to the three most important positions in the intelligence community points to the militarization of overall national security policy, which must be reversed. The military domination of the intelligence cycle makes it more difficult to rebuild strategic intelligence and to provide a check on the Pentagon's influence over foreign policy and the use of force. Failure of Intelligence is designed to inform such a debate and suggest a reform agenda. In this timely and important book, the author offers a provocative mingling of historical description with contemporary political analysis and reform prescription that challenges the conventional wisdom on clandestine collection. The book ultimately and persuasively asserts that the failure to have diplomatic relations has led to the inability to collect intelligence.

Table of Contents:
Chapter 1 1. The Central Intelligence Agency: Organizing for Intelligence Chapter 2 2. Crimes of the Central Intelligence Agency Chapter 3 3. Intelligence: The Importance of Success Chapter 4 4. Intelligence: The Consequences of Failure Chapter 5 5. The Perils of Politicization Chapter 6 6. The CIA and the Soviet Union: Success and Failure Chapter 7 7. CIA and the Threat of Terrorism Chapter 8 8. The 9/11 Tragedy and The Failure of Strategic Intelligence Chapter 9 9. The Iraq War and the White House Chapter 10 10. The Iraq War and the CIA Chapter 11 11. The Failure of Congressional Oversight Chapter 12 12. DCIs and The Decline and Fall of the CIA Chapter 13 13. What Needs To Be Done?

About the Author :
Melvin A. Goodman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and an adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University. He has more than forty years of experience in the CIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Department of Defense. He is the author or coauthor of six books, including Bush League Diplomacy: How the Neoconservatives are Putting the World at Risk (2004) and The Phantom Defense: The Case Against National Missile Defense (2001).

Review :
In Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA, former intelligence official Melvin Goodman chronicles how politicization and lack of vision can undercut and ultimately destroy from within an institution as vital to our nation's security as the CIA. Importantly, however, Goodman's thoroughly researched and lucidly written book does far more than recount past problems at the Agency. The most important aspect of Failure of Intelligence is that it looks beyond the past and the present to the future; and in so doing, offers sound and practical advice on how problems such as we've witnessed in the past can be remedied and avoided in the years ahead. This book is required reading for those who wish to understand how the C.I.A. failed to provide strategic warning of the 9-11 attacks and allowed itself to be used by the Bush administration to justify the invasion of Iraq, and what must be done to avoid such disasters in the future. Melvin Goodman provides a disturbing portrait of the collapse of the Central Intelligence Agency. His insider's look at an organization in decline is a must read by anyone, whether government official or ordinary citizen, who has taken false comfort in the notion of an American intelligence service securing the realm through timely analysis and effective covert action. The reality, an overly politicized agency where ego runs amok, is enough to send shivers down the spine of those who remain cognizant of the fact that there remain serious threats to legitimate American national security interests that must be accurately identified in advance if sound policy remedies are to be had. The CIA portrayed by Mr. Goodman has not only failed to perform this mission in the past, but remains incapable of accomplishing this critical task today. If ever there was a case for fundamental reformation of America's intelligence services, Goodman's Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA is it. In this study, Mel Goodman tells us that of the misunderstandings, mistakes, and misapplications of American intelligence and force that we've seen since 9/11 are nothing new - our CIA has been at it since the early days of the Cold War. But Goodman also tells us, with fresh information and insight, about the CIA's successes in those years and, most importantly, he names names again and again. His purpose is not payback, or 'Gotcha,' but to right a dangerous wrong. Mel Goodman's career in intelligence has positioned him perfectly to document the Failure of Intelligence, as he has in this critical, timely book. Mel Goodman thoroughly details the Bush administration's lies and manipulations in the lead up to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, as only a CIA insider could. As the lame duck Bush Administration beats the drum for war with Iran, Mel Goodman's Failure of Intelligence is essential reading. This is an important and eye-opening account for policy makers and concerned citizens alike. Impressive detail. In Failure of Intelligence: The Decline of the CIA, one of the agency's prickliest and most highly regarded analysts, Melvin A. Goodman, has given us an insider autopsy....What is most valuable here is the amassing of insider details.