Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea(Princeton Studies in International History and Politics)

In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, President Bill Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis. Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post-Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately defused. He begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the United States and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Sigal pays particular attention to an American mindset that prefers coercion to cooperation in dealing with aggressive nations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, he discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission, and the diplomatic deal of October 1994. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is less willing and able than before to expend unlimited resources abroad; as a result it will need to act less unilaterally and more in concert with other nations. What will become of an American foreign policy that prefers coercion when conciliation is more likely to serve its national interests? Using the events that nearly led the United States into a second Korean War, Sigal explores the need for policy change when it comes to addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation and avoiding conflict with nations like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. What the Cuban missile crisis was to fifty years of superpower conflict, the North Korean nuclear crisis is to the coming era.

Table of Contents:
PREFACE ix ABBREVIATIONS xiii 1 Uncooperative America 3 A History of Failure 5 Shared Uncertainty, Shared Certitude 10 The Politics of Diplomatic Paralysis 13 PART I: COERCION FAILS 15 2 The Bush Deadlock Machine 17 Dealing with Korean Insecurities 20 North Korea Reciprocates for U.S. Security Assurances 25 "One Meeting Means One Meeting" 32 Ignoring the North's Offer 38 Witnesses for the Prosecution 42 Interregnum Politics. No One Stands Up to Team Spirit 44 3 The Clinton Administration Ties Itself in Knots 52 Coaxing North Korea Part-way Back into the Treaty 55 The Reactor Deal Redux 65 Empty Threats 71 An Empty "Package Deal" 77 Seoul Gets the Shakes 84 4 A "Better than Even" Chance of Misestimation 90 The Collapse of "Super Tuesday" 95 Let Bygones Be Bygones, for Now 108 Stumbling to the Brink 113 5 Deadlock 124 PART II: COOPERATION SUCCEEDS 129 6 Open Covenants, Privately Arrived At 131 Private Contacts With Pyongyang 133 Pyongyang Reaches Out 137 The Hidden Hand in the First Joint Statement 140 Two Foundations Try to Jump-Start Diplomacy 143 Jimmy Carter refuses to Take "No" for an Answer 150 The Carter-Kim Deal 155 The Bushmen Go on Me Warpath 162 7 Getting to Yes 168 Kim Il Sung's Legacy 172 Putting Some chips on the Table 176 The October Agreed Framework 184 Decrying and Defending the Deal 192 The Issue at Kuala Lumpur: What's in a Name? 199 PART III: CONCLUSIONS 205 8 Nuclear Diplomacy in the News--An Untold Story 207 Unfamiliarity Breeds Contempt 208 Explaining News on Nuclear Diplomacy 219 Op-eds and Editorials 223 Possible Consequences of News Coverage 225 9 The Politics of Discouragement 229 No Interest in a Deal 229 The Foreign Policy Establishment 236 10 Why Won't America Cooperate? 244 Realism 246 The Liberal challenge to Realism 250 Cooperating With Strangers 251 Appendixes 255 Appendix I North Korea's Tit-for-Tat Negotiating Behavior 257 Appendix II Key Documents 260 NOTES 265 INDEX 307

About the Author :
Leon V. Sigal is a consultant at the Social Science Research Council in New York and Adjunct Professor in the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. A former member of The New York Times editorial board, he is also the author of Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945.

Review :
Winner of the 1998 Book of Distinction on the Practice of Diplomacy, The American Academy of Diplomacy "Sigal makes it disturbingly clear how close the world came to war in Korea in 1994. The product of hundreds of interviews, Disarming Strangers is also the most rigorously detailed account of U.S. policy towards North Korea yet published, and it will remain so for many years... An important and superbly researched book."--Michael J. Mazarr, Survival "This is a thought-provoking and disturbing book on American and North Korean diplomatic relations. Disarming Strangers is also an extremely well-researched study."--Bill Drucker, Korean Quarterly