Executive Decree Authority

When Boris Yeltsin calls out the tanks and shells parliament, or when he pins medals on veterans, both acts are called executive decrees, but we do not understand both to be equivalent examples of executive discretion over policymaking. Executives increasingly take (or are given) the authority to act without concurrent legislative action. This book offers a theory of political institutions that predicts when executives should turn to decree and when legislatures should accept--or even prefer--this method of making policy. Extensive case studies demonstrate how decree has been used and abused in widely different political environments.

Table of Contents:
1. Calling out the tanks or filling out the forms? John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart; 2. When the president governs alone: the decretazo in Argentina 1989–93 Delia Ferreira Rubio and Matteo Goretti; 3. Presidential decree authority in Russia, 1991–5 Scott Parrish; 4. Presidential usurpation or congressional preference?: the evolution of executive decree authority in Peru Gregory Schmidt; 5. Presidential decree authority in Venezuela Brian F. Crisp; 6. Dancing without a lead: legislative decrees in Italy Vincent Della Sala and Amie Kreppel; 7. The pen is mightier than the congress: Presidential decree power in Brazil Timothy J. Power; 8. Executive decree authority in France John D. Huber; 9. In search of the administrative President: Presidential 'decree' powers and policy implementation in the United States Brian R. Sala; 10. Institutional design and executive decree John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart; Appendix; References.

About the Author :
John M. Carey is John Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences at Dartmouth College. He has also taught at the Universidad Católica de Chile, the University of Rochester, Washington University in St Louis, Harvard University, and at the Fundación Juan March in Madrid, Spain. His interests are comparative politics, elections, and Latin American politics. His research focuses on institutional design and democratic representation. Carey's books include Legislative Voting and Accountability (Cambridge University Press), Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (with Matthew Shugart, Cambridge University Press), Term Limits in the State Legislatures (with Richard Niemi and Lynda Powell, University of Michigan Press), and Term Limits and Legislative Representation (Cambridge University Press). He has published articles in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, Perspectives on Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Electoral Studies, Party Politics, Comparative Politics, Latin American Politics and Society, Public Choice, Estudios Publicos, Political y Gobierno, the Revista de Ciencias Politicas, and the Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, as well as chapters in twenty edited volumes. Data and results from his research are available on his website (http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/).

Review :
"This important book is well worth the attention of comparativists and should serve as a guide to further endeavours in the field of executive-legislative relations." William M. Downs, Canadian Journal of Political Science "This intriguing book provides useful conceptual tools for analyzing presidential decree authority...Executive Decree Authority will be helpful both as a handbook that will inform the literature on the different practices of executive decree authority in various presidential democracies and as a work that provides a more nuanced analysis of the subject." Latin American Research Review "This important book is well worth the attention of comparativists and should serve as a guide to further endeavours in the field of executive-legislative relations." William M. Downs, Canadian Journal of Political Science