The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique(2 Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science)

This study is a philosophical critique of the foundations of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. As such, it also takes cognizance of his claim that psychoanalysis has the credentials of a natural science. It shows that the reasoning on which Freud rested the major hypotheses of his edifice was fundamentally flawed, even if the probity of the clinical observations he adduced were not in question. Moreover, far from deserving to be taken at face value, clinical data from the psychoanalytic treatment setting are themselves epistemically quite suspect.

Table of Contents:
Acknowledgments Introduction: Critique of the Hermeneutic Conception of Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy  Chapter 1. The Exegetical Legend of "Scientistic Self-Misunderstanding"  Chapter 2. Critique of Habermas's Philosophy of Psychoanalysis  A. Does the Dynamics of Psychoanalytic Therapy Exhibit the "Causality of Fate"?  B. Are Nomological Explanations in the Natural Sciences Generically Non-Historical, While Causal Accounts in Psychoanalysis are Historically-Contextual?  C. Does the Patient Have Privileged Cognitive Access to the Validation or Discreditation of Psychoanalytic Hypotheses?  Chapter 3. Critique of Ricoeur's Philosophy of Psychoanalysis  A. Ricoeur's Truncation of the Purview of Freudian Theory  B. Are Natural Science Modes of Explanation and Validation Gainsaid in Psychoanalysis By the Pathogenicity of Seduction Fantasies, Or By the Explanatory Role of "Meaning"?  C. Does the Theory of Repression Furnish a "Semantics of Desire"?  D. Ricoeur's Disposal of "The Question of Proof in Freud's Theory"  Chapter 4. Are Repressed Motives Reasons But Not Causes of Human Thought and Conduct?  Chapter 5. Critique of GeorgeS. Klein's Version of Hermeneutic Psychoanalysis  Chapter 6. The Collapse of the Scientophobic Reconstruction of Freud's Theory  Part I. The Clinical Method of Psychoanalytic Investigation: Pathfinder or Pitfall?  Chapter 1. Is Freud's Theory Empirically Testable?  A. Clinical versus Experimental Testability:Statement of the Controversy  B. The Purported Untestability of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Personality  Chapter 2. Did Freud Vindicate His Method of Clinical Investigation?  A. Are Clinical Confirmations an Artifact of the Patient's Positive "Transference" Feelings Toward the Analyst?  B. Freud's Reliance on the Hypothesized Dynamics of Therapy as a Vindication of his Theory of Unconscious Motivation  C. Was Freud's Attempted Therapeutic Vindication of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Personality Successful?  Part II. The Cornerstone of the Psychoanalytic Edifice: Is the Freudian Theory of Repression Well Founded?  Chapter 3. Appraisal of Freud's Arguments for the Repression Etiology of the Psychoneuroses  Chapter 4. Examination of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Slips-of Memory, the Tongue, Ear, and Pen  Chapter 5. Repressed Infantile Wishes as Instigators of All Dreams: Critical Scrutiny of the Compromise Model of Manifest Dream Content  Chapter 6. Appraisal of Freud's Further Arguments for the Emergence of Unadulterated Repressions Under "Free" Association  Chapter 7. Remarks on Post-Freudian Defenses of the Fundamental Tenets of Psychoanalysis Chapter 8. Can the Repression Etiology of Psychoneurosis Be Tested Retrospectively?  Part III. Epilogue  Chapter 9. The Method of Free Association and the Future Appraisal of Psychoanalysis  Chapter 10. Critique of Freud's Final Defense of the Probative Value of Data from the Couch: The Pseudo-Convergence of Clinical Findings Chapter 11. Coda on Exegetical Myth-Making in Karl Popper's Indictment of the Clinical Validation of Psychoanalysis Bibliography Indexes Name Index Subject Index  

About the Author :
Adolf Grunbaum (born May 15, 1923, Cologne, Germany) is a philosopher of science and a critic of psychoanalysis. He is also well known as a critic of Karl Popper's philosophy of science. He became the first permanent Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh in 1960. In that year, he also became the founding Director of that University's Center for Philosophy of Science, serving as Director until 1978. Currently, at the University of Pittsburgh, besides being the Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy of Science, he is Co-Chairman of its Center for Philosophy of Science (since 1978), Research Professor of Psychiatry (since 1979), and Primary Research Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science (since 2006).