Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference

In this book are thirty-two essays on reflexivity, which together form the classical basis for current research in this steadily growing area of study. They cover more than half a century of work that was inspired (directly or indirectly) by the intellectual misgivings and confusion that followed the discovery of the semantical and set-theoretical paradoxes. The papers were originally published in numerous journals and volumes of conference proceedings, and have been brought together here for the first time, where they are printed in facsimile. The individual essays were chosen for inclusion with three criteria in view: that each, when read in conjunction with others, should throw light on the evolution of thought about reflexivity; that each paper should, as we look back on the past sixty years of research, be recognizable as a basic contribution to current research; and that each article should point the interested reader on to other key contributions in the literature.

Table of Contents:
Introduction: The Role of Reflexivity in Understanding Human Understanding (S.J. Bartlett). Semantical Self-Reference. Paradox (W.V. Quine). The Theory of Types (P. Weiss). A System which can Define its own Truth (J. Myhill). Heterologicality (G. Ryle). Some Reflections on Reflexivity (J. Jorgenson). On Non-translational Semantics (R.M. Martin). Languages in Which Self-Reference is Possible (R.M. Smullyan). On a Family of Paradoxes (A.N. Prior). A Note on Self-Referential Statements (N. Rescher). Towards a Solution to the Liar Paradox (R.L. Martin). Presupposition, Implication and Self-Reference (B.C. van Fraassen) Pragmatical Self-Reference. Pragmatic Paradoxes (D.J. O'Connor). Mr. O' Connor's "Pragmatic Paradoxes" (L.J. Cohen). Pragmatic Paradoxes (P. Alexander). Fugitive Propositions (A. Duncan-Jones). Pragmatic Paradoxes and Fugitive Propositions (D.J. O'Connor). Pragmatic Implication (C.K. Grant). On Self-Reference (W.D. Hart). Metalogical Self-Reference. Self-Reference in Philosophy (F.B. Fitch). Universal Metalanguages for Philosophy (F.B. Fitch). The Idea of a Metalogic of Reference (S.J. Bartlett). Referential Consistency as a Criterion of Meaning (S.J. Bartlett) Computational Self-Reference. First Order Theories of Individual Concepts and Propositions (J. McCarthy). Foundations of a Functional Approach to Knowledge Representation (H.J. Levesque). A Computational Theory of Belief Introspection (K. Konolige). Languages with Self-Reference, I: Foundations (D. Perlis). Languages with Self-Reference, II: Knowledge, Belief, and Modality (D. Perlis). Self-Referential Argumentation. Cosmic Necessities (P. Weiss). On the Self-Reference of a Meaning Theory (R.J. Richman). Argumentation and Inconsistency (H.W. Johnstone, Jr.). On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law (A. Ross). Self-Referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity and Metaphysical Argumentation (J.M. Boyle, Jr.). Index.