Security with Solvency: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Shaping of the American Military Establishment

During World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower became convinced that the era of separate land, sea, and air operations was over and that future military operations would involve all three elements acting in concert. He foresaw that, once peace had been restored, the waste and duplication of effort which characterized America's military operations during the war would not be tolerated by an economy-minded Congress. A fiscal conservative, Eisenhower saw national security as dependent upon maintaining a healthy economy and a strong military. His goal, therefore, was the achievement of an efficient, properly balanced military establishment within the context of a healthy economy through the unification of the services into a single Cabinet level department. As Army Chief of Staff, adviser to Secretaries of National Defense James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, and then as president, Eisenhower was a leader in the effort to achieve unification. The final result of these efforts, the Military Reorganization Act of 1958, did not encompass all of the changes that Eisenhower originally sought. However, he had been instrumental in transforming the unorganized military establishment of pre-war America into a highly centralized organization led by a powerful secretary of defense. This structure would remain unchanged for twenty-eight years.

Table of Contents:
Introduction: "The Foundation of Military Strength Is Economic Strength." "Our Problem Should Be Solved on the Basis of What Is Best for National Security." "I Was Wrong,…I Cannot Make This Work. No One Can Make It Work." "A Hydra-headed Monster" "This Concept Is a Crystalized and Clarified Statement of This Administration's Understanding of Our National Security since World War II." "If the Administration Decides to Beef Up the Armed Forces along Lines Now Talked Of, the Whole Eisenhower Program Will Take a New Direction, Economic as well as Military." "The Day that Discipline Disappears from Our Forces…We Would Be Foolish to Put a Nickel into Them." "I Tried to Persuade the President That It Would Really Be Better for Me to Take Another Year on This." Epilogue: "In Our System Clausewitz Would Probably Make Full Colonel, Retire in 20 Years, and Go to Work for a Think Tank." Selected Bibliography Index

About the Author :
GERARD CLARFIELD is Professor of American Diplomatic History at the University of Missouri. He is the author of numerous books, including Nuclear America, which he co-authored with William Wiecek of Syracuse University, and a two volume history of United States foreign policy.