Democracy's Privileged Few: Legislative Privilege and Democratic Norms in the British and American Constitutions

Why should a developing country surrender its power to create money by adopting an international currency as its own? This comprehensive book explores the currency problems that developing countries face and offers sound, practical advice for policymakers on how to deal with them. Manuel Hinds, who has extensive experience in real-world economic policy-making, challenges the myths that surround domestic currencies and shows the clear rationality for dollarization or the use of a standard international currency. The book opens with an entertaining story of the Devil who, through a series of common macroeconomic manoeuvres, coaches the President of a mythical country into financial ruin and purchases its entire assets for $1.50. The path this ruler took is one taken by several developing countries and has resulted in financial crises and political upheaval. Hinds goes on to introduce new ways of thinking about financial systems and monetary behavior in Third World countries. He provides an essential, incisive guide not only to making currency decisions but also to executing them successfully.

Review :
"A thorough and well-researched treatment of an important and neglected topic. Chafetz's historical overview on legislative privilege deserves to become a well-known point of reference."-Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School "A very distinguished work. Chafetz is beautifully clear and deals with an interesting problem concerning parliamentary government in Britain and America in a comparative manner. I do not know of any work which covers the ground in a similar way."-Vernon Bogdanor, Oxford University "Josh Chafetz manages to combine scholarly care with an almost journalistic ability to write in an accessible fashion."-Nick Barber, Oxford University "This book heralds the arrival of an important new scholar in the fields of comparative constitutional law and legal history. Fitting a broad range of institutional details into a comprehensive and subtle theoretical framework, Chafetz shows how Congressional privileges in America and Parliamentary privileges in England sprang from common origins but then evolved along separate paths as a result of basic differences in the political ecosystems. An excellent chronicle of the evolution of legislative privileges from the parliamentary supremacy of England to the popular sovereignty in kingless America."-Akhil Amar, Yale Law School 0;A thorough and well-researched treatment of an important and neglected topic. Chafetz7;s historical overview on legislative privilege deserves to become a well-known point of reference.1;2;Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School -- Adrian Vermeule